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“For a punishment to be 
just it should consist of only 
such gradations of intensity 
as suffice to deter men from 
committing crimes” 
 
 
 
Cesarea Beccaria, (1734-1794) [Bonesana, Marchese di], 
Italian criminologist and penal reformer,  
“On Crimes and Punishments”, 1764. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: Transportation of Stowaways, Drugs and  Contraband by 
    Sea from the Maghreb region: Legal & policy aspects 
 
Degree:   MSc    
 
 This dissertation is a study of the sensitive and complex maritime security 
issues of transportation of stowaways, smuggling drugs and contraband goods by sea 
from the Maghreb region. It considers the national and international contexts within 
which those threats have grown and discusses the root causes and consequences of 
this menace with emphasis on legal and policy aspects. This latter represents a 
challenge for the Maghreb States related to strategies, decision making fostering new 
reforms and proactive countermeasures. A particular focus on the notion of 
“maritime crime” is offered.   
 An overview of the new maritime security concerns faced by the Maghreb 
region and the evolution of law and policy related to these “criminal acts” is 
provided with regard to the transnational scope, spectrum and continuum of maritime 
crimes. Particular emphasis is given to the roles of IMO and Maghreb’s policy 
makers and the usefulness of maritime security assessment tools. A brief look is 
taken at the policy development in the Maghreb region and its response to the 
menace. Additionally, the Danish and Swedish experiences in this context are 
provided. An analysis of different security concepts and models is offered, such as 
the mapping concept which was evaluated for further use by policy makers.  
 The concluding chapter examines the findings of the different reviews and 
analyses carried out. Furthermore, it draws a number of recommendations 
concerning the legal and policy aspects, potential security measures to be 
implemented and the need for further studies and investigation in the subject. 
 
KEYWORDS: Stowaway, smuggling, contraband, maritime crime, mapping 
concept, security assessment tool, criminal act, spectrum, continuum, crime. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“The more laws and order are made prominent, the more thieves and robbers there will be”- 
Lao-tzu, Chinese Taoist philosopher, 600 BC-531 BC 
 
 
 
 Potential risks to maritime adventure, such as stowaways, human trafficking, 
smuggling or transportation of contraband goods by sea are threatening sea trade and 
creating new concerns to the shipping industry. This phenomenon is increasing and 
indicates a deep and complex problem in view of the latest records and data 
published by the competent national authorities and international organizations 1 . 
Even though the ISPS Code 2  has been implemented and some countries have 
reinforced their legislation3 to combat these threats, the situation has not improved in 
many regions worldwide and particularly in the Maghreb4, leading to the necessity of 
reviewing the existing policy, examining deeply the root causes and finding the most 
appropriate solutions to tackle these complex issues.  
 
 Maritime crimes and illicit activities at sea5 are still menacing port facilities 
and ships, creating new risks and various unforeseen events with potentially 
disastrous consequences for the maritime industry, such as containers being used by 
                                                 
1 See Reports on Stowaway Incidents, annual statistics for the year 2006, FAL.2/Circ.102  
(January 17, 2007), International Maritime Organization (IMO), trends highlighting the increase of 
stowaways incidents in certain regions for 2006, 
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D17422/102.pdf>,  (April 4, 2007). 
2 ISPS Code means International Ship and Port Facility Security Code  and SOLAS Amendments adopted 
on 12 December 2002, International Maritime Organization, (London: 2003). 
3 As example, U.S Homeland Security Act, (U.S), 2002, I, s.101, reinforcement of U.S legislation. 
4 Ninna N. Nyberg Sørensen, Mediterranean Transit Migration, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
International Studies, 2006,at pp.26-33, highlighted the sensitive issue on migration from the Maghreb 
region. The countries in this region are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and the Western 
Sahara. 
5 See Steven Haines, “The Law of the Sea and Maritime Crime”, in P.A.H. Parritt, Crime at Sea, (London: 
The Nautical Institute, 1996) at p.19. 
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 criminals to transport all sorts of prohibited goods and/or people 6 . In addition, 
stowaways, cargo crimes and smuggling have become a part of organized crime 7 or 
syndicates, threatening the transportation system and supply chain, involving in 
many cases transnational organized crime, because they are the highest profile and 
lucrative maritime criminal activities worldwide, creating a major profit hub for them.  
   
 In this regard, various scenarios including criminals or terrorists trying to 
board vessels in the same manner as stowaways or smugglers can create a serious 
menace for the whole transportation chain, and have considerable impacts on safety, 
security, environment and policy8. Disruption of trade, detention, longer delays, fines 
and penalties are faced by ship owners, imposing higher costs burden on the 
maritime industry and creating new needs and challenges for their governments to 
address and solve these sensitive security issues. Criminalization of seafarers9 and 
State’s responsibility concerns have been raised and pushed on to the international 
agenda.  Public pressure, maritime claims and governments’ protests post 9-11 
event10, and even the implementation of ISPS Code, grew to decrease the incidents 
in hot spots areas11 , such as the Maghreb and to compel policy makers to take 
adequate measures in combating these threats12. Maritime security is considered as 
an integral part of IMO’s responsibilities. However, the international instruments 
                                                 
6 Chris Trelawny, “Containerized cargo security- a case for “joined up” government” , IMO News No.2, 
2006 at pp.1-3. 
7 Council of the E.U, “Organized Crime Report”, (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2005), at p.14. 
8 Fred D. Collie, “21st century Policing-the institutionalization of Homeland Security in local enforcement 
organizations”, thesis, (Monterey-USA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006), pp.47-49.  
< http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA445343> , (April, 2007). 
9  See Proshanto K. Mukherjee, “Criminalization and unfair treatment: The seafarer’s perspective”, 
Greenwich paper, CMI, (Cape Town: Comité Maritime International (CMI), 2006), pp.1-14.  
< http://www.comitemaritime.org/Capetown/pdf/11.pdf> , (May 3, 2007). 
10 Means the aftermath of the tragic events of the 11 September 2001, which resulted in a dramatic shift of 
the notion of “security” by introducing new security measures for the maritime industry and concerns, 
assessing the risks and potential consequences faced by the international shipping community. IMO and 
ILO responded proactively in considering these sensitive issues. 
11 “Reinforcing the management of the European Union’s Southern Maritime Borders, considering the 
necessity to develop a European model for integrated border management due to public and EU Member 
States’ pressure with regard to issues on illegal migration, stowaways and asylum seekers”, Communication 
733 final, (Commission of the European Communities, November 30, 2006),  pp.1-13. 
12 See John Morrison and Berth Crosland, “The Trafficking and smuggling of refugees: the end game in 
European asylum policy?”, Research working paper No.39, (UNHCR, April 15, 2001) at p.2, emphasising 
on the extra border enforcement and burden-shifting policies related to these issues. 
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 implemented and considered as adequate to prevent stowaways, drugs, contraband of 
goods and all forms of smuggling failed to reduce the trends observed during recent 
years 13 . The extent of implementation of these conventions highlighted the 
difficulties in policy making and drafting legislation, to ensure an efficient 
satisfactory framework to tackle all issues generated by these threats and challenges 
faced by the shipping industry. Lack of uniformity and harmonization observed 
worldwide for domestic law and penal regime for maritime crimes are inadequate.  
          
 As illustrated in Figure 1, the Maghreb is facing new security concerns and 
challenges, which are pushing the maritime sector and trade under pressure. Hence, 
Unites Nations (U.N) organizations, European Union (E.U), IMO and ILO are 
reconsidering the problem of stowaways, drugs and contraband, even though 
numerous conventions are already dealing with the subject. However, grey areas still 
persist and there is an unresolved conflict among them, regarding a clear definition 
of criminal acts and how to deal with them if they are committed on a foreign flag 
state vessel in state jurisdictions. The examination of previous literature revealed that 
the existing policies in the Maghreb are inadequate. There is a necessity to address 
these sensitive issues not previously considered and to conduct an in-depth 
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Figure 1: Policy makers and the maritime sector under pressure: stormy era 
                                                 
13See, IMO’s annual statistics for 200 6 and the trends for the last five years appearing in Appendix C. 
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 analysis of the root causes and consequences related to the menace in the hot areas14. 
As long lapses are present in the described system as mentioned in Figure 1, there 
will be pressure on the Maghreb region and the shipping industry to ameliorate their 
policies by improving the legal framework and ensuring harmonization and 
uniformity of the judicial systems. However, there is little information available on 
how to resolve the problem by providing adequate solutions in policy formulation. 
 
 The main aim of this dissertation is to undertake a critical review of these 
issues by analysing the legal aspects, the root causes and potential consequences, 
areas of problems, their impacts on legal regimes, government policies and strategies 
on the basis of findings, and providing solutions for the Maghreb States and the 
maritime sector with emphasis on policy proposals.  
  
 Therefore, the dissertation itself is divided into chapters as follows:  
  
 Chapter 2 provides a historical background to the subject and undertakes a 
critical review of the existing literature and discusses how the revision process of all 
related instruments may provide an effective and balanced way to achieve a 
harmonized and unified legal framework. Chapter 3 examines in-depth the main 
features of the principal international conventions and domestic laws of the Maghreb 
States, and highlights areas that need improvement. Chapter 4 then focuses on state 
responsibility, government policies and strategies. This discussion also examines 
conflicting interests and assesses their impacts on policy making, and provides an 
overview of relevant findings and proposals by setting out the social, economic and 
political implications of such for the Maghreb region. In this context, the Swedish 
experience15 on the subject will also be discussed and analyzed. Finally, based on the 
principal findings an overall verdict of the issue will be offered16. 
                                                 
14 See “Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe”, document prepared by Research 
and Analysis Section of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UNODC, July, 2006), at p.8. 
15 Personal and electronic interviews were conducted with officials of the Swedish Maritime Administration, 
customs and police. 
16 The sources used for analysis in this dissertation consist of primary and secondary data, official statistics, 
journal articles, survey research, academic books, and internet websites and newspapers articles.  
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CHAPTER 2  
MARITIME CRIMES: EVOLUTION OF LAW AND POLICY  
“Good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while bad people will find a way 
around laws” - Plato, Ancient Greek Philosopher, 428 BC-348 BC 
 
 
 
2.1 Historical background 
 
The migration phenomenon from Africa to Asia and Europe began with our 
earliest human ancestors, and the first human societies, approximately one million 
years ago. People moved or migrated from one location to another, seeking a better 
life, food, trade, thereby creating massive flows of people 17 . The Maghreb 
countries 18  located in the northern part of Africa are an important piece of this 
complex process. Due to their geographical position and coastlines boarding the 
North Atlantic Ocean westward, and the Mediterranean Sea in the northern and 
eastern parts, the impact of the migration flows in the region has been significant, 
raising through centuries various complex forms of transnational issues, borders 
claims, security concerns and tragedies19. The rush of people towards Europe has set 
the stage for various humanitarian catastrophes, such as sea crossings ending in 
                                                 
17 For more information on migration in history, see IOM, “Migration & History”, the term migration is 
used to describe movements of people in various situations and context, covering a wide range of 
behaviours and highlighting the dilemma on the concept of migration and its definition, varying from one 
jurisdiction to another, involving complex forms of flows, depending on various factors, based on social, 
economical, political, and cultural considerations.<http://www.iom.int/jahia/page262.html>, (April 2, 2007).   
18The Maghreb countries are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania. The data and references 
used for the purpose of this dissertation are based only on the three first named countries, and on a regional 
approach concept for the general debate. See Appendix A for a map of the Maghreb. 
19 Conquests, invasions, population transfers are associated with all forms of human tragedies, trafficking of 
women and children, refugees, asylum seekers, stowaways, organized crime, transnational criminal 
organizations, illicit activities , piracy, robbery and various others criminal offences. 
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 deaths of hunger or injuries or starvation and in some cases in drowning or missing 
after a failed attempt to reach a safe haven20.  
 
In contrast, transportation of contraband goods and stowaways have their roots 
in the earliest human societies, from the ancient Egyptian era to the Babylonian 
empire, where the Hammurabi Code 21  was the first primitive code of laws, 
containing an enumeration of crimes and their various settlements for common 
disputes and citizens’ conduct. The “Phoenician”22 civilization was an enterprising 
maritime trading culture that spread across the Mediterranean by means of galleys 
and generated revenues in the Maghreb. In the Roman law, the notion of “ius 
privatum” included personal, property, civil and criminal law; judicial proceeding 
was a private process, “iudicium privatum”, and crimes were private, except the most 
severe ones that were prosecuted by the state 23 . However, the notion of illicit 
activities at sea, maritime crimes and maritime offences evolved through the 
centuries; smugglers or “contrebandiers”24 became more diversified and fearsome. 
During the 13th century, crimes and corresponding punishments were severe, when 
smuggling and various forms of contraband increased25 in England. Privateering, 
piracy, organized crime, corruption, trafficking, wreck plunders and stowaways 
                                                 
20 Thomas Spijkerboer, “The human costs of border control”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 28 
April 2007 at pp.127-139. 
21See the Hammurabi Code, c. 1780 BCE at passage 34 “If a . . . or a . . . harm the property of a captain, 
injure the captain, or take away from the captain a gift presented to him by the king, then the . . ……. 
or . . . .shall be put to death”, it regulated also liquor traffic, false entries or claims against traveling agents, 
frauds and crimes by introducing a primitive form of policing system, 
<http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/MESO/CODE.HTM>,(March 22,2007). 
22 See Appendix B for the impacts of the Phoenicians trade route in the Maghreb region, 1200 BC-900 BC. 
23 William Turpin, “Reviewed work(s)-The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome by Olivia .F. Robinson”, The 
American Historical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (June, 1997), at pp.792-793. Under Roman law, forgery of 
documents and counterfeiting were punishable for falsum, but theft and smuggling were treated as private 
delicts. 
24 Contrebandier means smuggler in French, considered as a trafficker of goods using all means of transport. 
25  See Mary Aris, “Crime and the Sea-The Maritime Dimension, Crime and Punishment a Welsh 
Perspective”, (Gwynedd Archives Service, 1987) at pp. 27-33. Smuggling began when tax collectors were 
appointed and poverty made it attractive. Smuggled goods were, inter alia, rum, tea, sugar, salt, coffee, 
liquors, silk and alcohols. Networks were instituted regarding their sale and new types of ships were used. 
Entire communities were involved. However, the government actions were proportional to the threats and 
customs men, searchers and informers were used to collect duties and track down the phenomena of 
smuggling contraband. Fines, penalties and deportation were enforced to reduce criminal activities 
prevailing in particular areas.   
6 
 flourished in Europe and spread worldwide, using new sea routes to colonies or 
undiscovered lands. Wars and permanent economic and political instability, and the 
transportation phenomenon of contraband of goods  declined in Western Europe due 
to free trade agreements, moral pressure, customs regulations and taxes; but 
increased in other parts of the world, particularly in Asia, Africa and the new world, 
where new colonies, “comptoirs”26 became popular, and tolerated  these activities for  
generating new revenues. In 1509, the legend of Vasco Núňez de Balboa was born, 
from stowaway to expedition leader 27 , offering new portals to adventurers. The 
Maghreb countries instead faced instability and numerous conflicts, resulting in an 
increase of smuggling and migration flows towards southern Europe borders or the 
Middle East. 
 
At that time, North Africa was under the Ottoman Empire without delimited 
boundaries and its main activities were characterized by trade, using all means of 
transportation. The Maghreb Diaspora, ruling tribes, instabilities and conflicts 
diverted the smuggling activity from caravans to vessels. New portals were explored 
by primitive smugglers and high skilled merchants trading on a larger scale between 
Africa and European or Middle East empires around the Mediterranean Sea, where 
exchanges of goods, habits and new types of contraband were reintroduced to the 
region and these deeply influenced the local society. New drugs28 appeared and their 
impacts on the Maghreb population were significant. However, the tendency of 
contraband focused mainly on ordinary goods, weapons and commodities. The 
“Barbary Coast ”29, in the sixteenth century and until the nineteenth centuries was 
facing numerous issues related to piracy, slave trade, contraband between the 
continent and the southern part of Europe mainly, and drug culture, such as those 
                                                 
26 Comptoirs means trading factory; a term used by the French during the past centuries to designate 
colonies downgraded to comptoirs for commercial purposes.  
27 See Vasco Núñez de Balboa, Spanish conquistador, embarking as a stowaway on an expedition organized 
by Martin Feranadez de Enriço. < http://encycl.opentopia.com/term/Vasco_Núñez_de_Balboa > 
 (April 3, 2007).   
28 See UNODC, surveys in 2005 highlighting the use or trade in the Maghreb of cannabis and cocaine. 
29 Also means Barbary States for some scholars; a term used by Europeans to refer to the coast regions in 
North Africa. Nowadays, they consist of independent countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. 
 < www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0806137.html >,  (May 28, 2007). 
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 done by “ kif ”30 growers from the “Rif Mountains”31. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the Ottoman Empire had declined due to internal conflicts. From the period 
of colonization to the prohibition era and until recent years, smuggling in all its 
forms, illicit activities, drugs offences by sea and stowaways 32 , as well as the 
increasing risk of terrorism became a major problem worldwide and in particular in 
the Maghreb region, threatening sea trade and the whole maritime industry33. 
 
2.2 Maritime security concerns: Bottlenecks and Snares 
 
Acts of piracy, robbery, terrorism and smuggling, as defined in the post 
September 11th environment34, are not new to the Maghreb States. However, new 
security concerns emerged, which were not previously considered by the legislators 
and the whole maritime sector, such as ships and port facilities may provide terrorists 
or criminals the opportunity and ability to plot and strike targets around sensitive 
areas, critical infrastructures and vulnerable points. These criminal activities, apart 
from piracy and terrorism have plagued the international maritime transportation 
chain well before the 9-11. In contrast, sweeping changes in security aboard ships 
                                                 
30 In Morocco, cannabis is known as kif, traditionally cultivated in the Rif’s area. 
31 Mountainous region situated in the northern part of Morocco, belonging to the Gibraltar Arc, wraps 
around the northern and southern sides of the Alboran Sea.  
< http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9063659/Rif>, (May 28, 2007). 
32 See FAL.2/Circ.103 regarding the Reports on Stowaways Incidents during the period from January to 
April 2007, International Maritime Organization (IMO), London: IMO, (April 24, 2007) at pp.1-24 and 
MSC.3/Circ.12, “Unsafe Practices associated with the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea”, 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), London: IMO, (January19, 2007) at p.22 and p.26.  
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D17499/12.pdf>,  (May, 2007).  
Additionally, features on human trafficking as published by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), and the annual report 2007 as well as world drug reports and trends from 2000 to 2006, 
illustrated the problem of cross-borders and vulnerable communities and their grips. For the Maghreb States 
considered as transit countries, particular attention on Mauritania was made due to its porous borders and 
lack of law enforcement agencies dealing with maritime criminal activities and offences. Also, in 2006, a 
grave humanitarian problem emerged and was noted by that office with emphasis on their impacts on the 
sea trade and shipping industry. See “World Drug Report 2006, volume 1: Analysis”, UNODC, (Geneva: 
UNPUBH, 2006), < http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006_volume1.pdf>, (June, 2007). 
33 See Gillian Whittaker, “IMO aims to ease headache caused by stowaways”, Trade Winds, (March 16, 
2007), at p.42. A response done by the maritime industry due to various concerns raised on the subject and 
proposed to reduce delays, long procedures and added stress on masters and crews of ships in different 
regions worldwide, and consequently suggested the creation of an IMO Stowaway Focal Point (SFP). 
34 Supra, footnote 10 at p.2, after the 1st July 2004; new security requirements were put into force through 
the implementation of ISPS Code and the development of policy strategies to tackle these issues and their 
impacts on trade, legislation and public perception. 
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 and at port facilities were established when the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code) 35 was adopted by IMO in 2002 and entered into force on 
1st July 2004. Ships navigating high seas and port facilities are obliged to comply 
with special measures aimed at increasing defence against potential threats or 
aggressions. Even though the implementation process was done successfully by the 
Maghreb States36, the threats37 observed and risks involved, highlighted the core of 
the debate to be undertaken regarding existing laws, policies and new security 
concerns, which were put into the arena and later, resulted in a paradigm shift of 
security measures in this region.  
 
Therefore, the first debate starts with the notion of maritime crime and 
maritime criminal law to provide a clear picture of the topic38 and to avoid myths or 
misconceptions39. 
2.3 The nature and threat of maritime crime  
 
            A clear understanding of what is a crime necessitates an appreciation of its 
juridical nature and form.  A crime is defined as a violation of criminal law, a wrong 
                                                 
35 The main objectives of ISPS Code are “to establish an international security framework to detect security 
threats and take all necessary protective measures by fixing clear roles and responsibilities for governments, 
industry and the personnel involved, ensuring early and efficient collection and exchange of security 
information, providing methodology for security assessments and finally ensuring confidence between 
nations that security is in force”, IMO, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS 
Amendments adopted on 12 December 2002, 2003 ed., London: IMO, at p.6. 
36 The Maghreb States notified and reported to IMO on the different steps undertaken to ensure an efficient 
and effective implantation of ISPS Code. See Annex J for the status of Conventions regarding these 
countries. 
37 See, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migration Initiatives Appeal 2007, report, Geneva: 
IOM, (January, 2007), at pp.23-26, massive sub-Saharan population displaced and transiting through this 
region to get free passage to Europe, organized crime issues, drugs and terrorism are the main threats faced 
by the coastal states in the Maghreb; Mediterranean side and Atlantic side are at risks regarding the latest 
publications on the issue. See, UNODC Annual Report 2007 and Europol, EU Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment, (OCTA). <http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/OCTA/OCTA2006.pdf>, (May, 2007). 
38 The general public or an unadvised reader may be confused by the notions of crime, offences, illegal 
activities at sea and maritime criminal law. The media often present these subjects from different angles, 
where romanticism and sensation take over reality. 
39 The understanding of crime and the criminal system of a country are primordial to avoid “myths” or false 
“perceptions” by the public. Myths are beliefs based on emotion rather than analysis of the subject, whereas, 
misconception is a failure to understand correctly or to misinterpret a notion on a particular topic. 
<http://www.answers.com/perceptions>, (June, 2007). 
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 which the government deems injurious to the public and prosecutable in a criminal 
proceeding 40 . Similarly, another definition stipulates that it is “an act or the 
commission of an act that is forbidden or the omission of a duty that is commanded 
by a public law and that makes the offender liable to punishment by that law”41. 
Therefore, a crime is considered as an illegal act that threatens the security and good 
order of society. The use of law regulates human behavior. In this respect the 
criminal law is the body dealing with crimes and their punishment according to the 
law in existence that makes it so, constituting an effort to deter others from 
misbehaving and ensuring equity and fairness in the society. Beccaria 42 argued “that 
laws should be clear in defining crimes so that judges do not interpret the law, but 
only decide whether a law has been broken”. This highlights the importance of the 
relationship between crimes and punishments, implying a fair and recognized 
criminal justice system acceptable by the society to fix clear lines between the 
offender and the public. The links between the notion of crime and criminal law are 
found in two ancient principles; “nullum crimen sine poena” and “nulla poena sine 
lege”. 
 
           The sources and theory of international criminal law can be found in both 
convention and non-convention regimes, such as treaties, national legislation or texts 
prepared by the Comité Maritime International (CMI).The sources of international 
criminal law are conventions, customs, general principles of law of civilized Nations, 
judicial decisions and writings of publicists43. Maritime crime might be defined as a 
criminal offence linked to the sea or ships, because it concerns only crimes at sea or 
on board ships, involving complex issues on jurisdiction, rights and obligations of 
                                                 
40 A crime in the widest sense is an act that violates the law. In a narrow sense, it is a violation of criminal 
law, involving behavior that breaks the criminal law and is liable to public prosecution and punishment. 
41See definition of crime, < http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/crime>, (April 6, 2007). 
42 Cesare Beccaria is an Italian criminologist who wrote an essay on “Crimes and Punishment” in 1764 and 
stated that a punishment quickly follows a crime. The two ideas of crime and punishment will be associated 
in a person’s mind. Also, he gave the first proportion between crimes and punishment, such as those related 
to smuggling, attempted crimes and how to prevent them by introducing the notion of education and pardon. 
43 See Cherif M. Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, 2nd edition, Crimes, V.I (New York: Transnational 
Publishers Inc., 1999) at p.11 and p.31.The sources of international law are stipulated in Article 38(1) of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute. It is the core document of international criminal law nowadays. 
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 States and their enforcement regimes44. However, crimes committed on shore rest 
with coastal or port state jurisdiction. Numerous criminal activities fall within this 
definition and form a breach of law and disciplines at sea, such as piracy, terrorism, 
drug trafficking, stowaways, maritime fraud45, theft, human smuggling, sabotage, 
transport of slaves, smuggling contraband, illegal fishing and marine environmental 
offences 46. 
 
 An important point to be highlighted is that there is a difference between 
crimes and offences both of which fall under the penal regime, depending on the 
degree of severity of the offence. Criminal offences are more severe than regulatory 
offences; the sanctions depend on the standard tolerable by the society, and on the 
spectrum of mens rea. The intent to cause a damage or acting recklessness and with 
the knowledge of that act could damage, fall both under the regime of criminal 
offences47.  
 
 Maritime crime is often transnational by nature, involving one or more 
jurisdictions and revealing the complex issues on diverse sources, which may come 
into the picture regarding laws, codes, rules and regulations pertaining to criminal 
activities at sea. The controversy is that various conventions deal with or tackle the 
same subject from different angles, leading in most cases to different approaches 
regarding liability regimes and sanctions for a similar case. The lack of uniformity 
and harmonization of procedures related to maritime crimes have generated new 
debates and needs at national and international levels. However, crimes are only 
                                                 
44  See Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons, 1983 at pp.936-937.  
45 The dimensions of international maritime crime , regarding documentary fraud in international trade as 
mentioned by Eric Ellen in Martin Gill (ed.), Issues in maritime crime; mayhem at sea, Leicester: 
Perpetuity Press,1995, at pp.4-10, Also described by Eric Ellen and Donald Campbell, International 
Maritime Fraud, London: Sweet & Maxwell,1981 at p.24 regarding classification of maritime crimes. 
46 See the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, SUA convention 88, as amended for the provisions related to the offences and the measures to 
be taken to establish jurisdiction, also other relevant international instruments such as UN treaties, IMO 
conventions, IOM and UNODC for conventions on maritime crimes, jurisdictional issues etc. 
47 Mens rea in Latin means guilty mind. As pointed out by Professor Mukherjee, the general rule applicable 
to criminal cases is “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”, in “Criminalization and unfair treatment: the 
seafarer’s perspective, paper presented in seminar”, Capetown: CMI, 2006, at pp.1-13. 
< http://www.cmi2006capetown.info/presentations/Mukherjee.doc>, (June10, 2007). 
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 identified by the international framework and the States have only the obligation to 
establish a penal regime or mechanism in their laws to be in conformity with the 
requirements specified in it. Lack of specifications on what penal requirements 
should be, are observed in the maritime sector. Therefore, in different jurisdictions, 
various forms of liabilities and sanctions are found, regarding maritime crimes and 
related offences48. These problems can be solved for states lacking procedures of 
enforcement and having difficulties to “transform appropriately an international 
legislation into national legislation, by using adequate implementation methodologies, 
based on monistic or dualistic approach”49. Another aspect regarding the subject of 
maritime crimes which needs to be addressed is the notion of transnational and 
international crimes and the related jurisdictional issues on how a State can exercise 
its criminal jurisdiction to events or incidents happening within its territories 50 . 
Complex solutions to jurisdictional issues are available for consideration. One 
famous case on the subject is the Wildenhus’s Case51. Also, a lot of differences exist 
between States regarding the use of general principles on which they may base 
jurisdiction over crimes according to their domestic law and ratified treaties.   
  
 Illicit activities at sea, mainly onboard ships have always been a struggle for 
policy makers regarding law enforcement related to cargo theft, the growing risk of 
stowaways smuggled in containers or hidden in vessels, smuggling of prohibited 
                                                 
48  See Jayant Abhyankar, “Maritime Crime” in Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in 
Maritime Security, Malmö: World Maritime University, 2005 at pp.201-243.  
49 Proshanto K. Mukherjee, “Transformation of conventions into national legislation: piracy and  
 suppression of unlawful acts” in Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maximo Q. Mejia Jr., Gotthard M.Gauci (ed.), 
 Maritime Violence and other Security Issues at Sea, Malmö: World Maritime University, 2005 at pp.71-75.  
50 John Liljedahl, “Transnational and international crimes: jurisdictional issues”, in Proshanto K.   
Mukherjee, Maximo Q. Mejia Jr., Gotthard M.Gauci (ed.), Maritime Violence and other Security Issues at 
Sea, Malmö: World Maritime University, 2005 at p.115.  
51 Wildenhus’s Case, 120.U.S.1 (1887), Wildenhus and Fijens were Belgian sailors aboard a Belgian 
steamship anchored in the port of Jersey City, New Jersey. In a fight below decks, Wildenhus stabbed and 
killed Fijens. The Jersey City police learned about this incident and arrested Wildenhus. Several Belgian 
crew members witnessed this incident and were placed in the port jail as witnesses for the proceedings 
against Wildenhus. The treaty between Belgium and the US ceded "primary" jurisdiction over onboard 
crimes to the respective flag States to which the vessels were registered. This foreign official was acting on 
behalf of Belgium, referring to himself as the "petitioner." The issue was whether the port tranquility 
doctrine should be applied to deprive the flag State (Belgium) of its primary jurisdiction under the treaty. 
 <http://www.vlex.us/caselaw/U-S-Supreme-Court/Wildenhus%2527s-Case-120-U-S-1-1887/2100-
20064425%2C01.html>,  (April 7, 2007). 
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 devices , contraband of goods and trafficking of human beings , the involvement of 
organised criminal groups and  transnational issues, creating huge debate on what 
constitutes maritime crime, criminal offence, regulatory offence and their 
punishments according to the law and society interests. Consequently, as described in 
Figure 2, the risks generated by the offence, the nature and form of the maritime 
crime and their punishments (sanctions) are closely related, and move gradually in 
time and space with regard to threats involved, depending on each particular feature 
of the studied case. Also, the perception and the notion of maritime crime may vary 
from one jurisdiction to another, from country to country or region to region, creating 
the urgent need for reforms, cooperation in drafting legislation or instigating states to 
find a new way, based on a common agreement under the umbrella of IMO with the 
participation and assistance of CMI 52  to tackle these sensitive issues on a fixed 
agenda. Hence, the results and consequences could be beneficial for developing 
countries and may lead to the creation of a new Code on maritime crimes, which may 
be accepted by the whole maritime community for ensuring harmonisation of 
procedures and unification of rules at all levels in any contracting state or region 
worldwide. The sanctions are subject to the nature and form of the crime as 
mentioned in Figure 2. Policy makers may use it for drafting legislation. 
 
 
Figure 2: Maritime crimes and their punishments: Threats & Consequences 
                                                 
52 The CMI is involved with the issue of maritime crime and is cooperating with the Legal Committee of 
IMO in drafting model national law dealing with the problem of criminal acts committed on board foreign 
flag ships. Also, it is considering the issues on maritime violent acts and their impacts on legislation. The 
CMI stated that “It is vital that a distinction be made between a maritime crime and an inadvertent act 
leading to a catastrophic result”. Harsh criminal sanctions against seafarers are threatening the sea trade and 
the whole shipping industry leading to a shortage of crews. 
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  The second point to be introduced and discussed in this debate is related to 
the spectrum of violent maritime acts in order to cast light on the topical issues. 
2.3.1 The Spectrum of violent maritime acts 
 
           Figure 3 illustrates, on the one hand, the less violent maritime crimes and 
offences, such as fraud, human trafficking, smuggling, contraband, stowaways, 
illegal migrants, theft, narcotic drugs smuggling, wreck plundering, illegal fishing 
and offences against the environment; and highly or more violent maritime acts, such 
as piracy, armed robbery, sabotage, hijacking with ransom, hostage taking, 
kidnapping and terrorism on the other hand. The debate commences where the 
crimes and offences are situated on the scale chosen to classify them in a logical 
order, highlighting the corresponding risks or threats and the adequate 
countermeasures. 
 
Figure 3: The spectrum of violent Maritime acts53
     
           This spectrum highlights the degree of the violent maritime act and related 
risks or threats, and by analogy the reader can easily deduce the scale of 
countermeasures needed to mitigate or to reduce the potential consequences. Hence, 
                                                 
53  This figure has been inspired by MLAW 301, lecture handouts on “Maritime Crime & Maritime 
Criminal Law, Advanced Issues in Public and Private Maritime Law” of Assistant Professor Maximo Q. 
Mejia, WMU, (March 8, 2007). Risks, threats and countermeasures are easily deducted from the spectrum. 
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 legislators or policy makers may use it as preventive measures to be put into force as 
a tool to find an acceptable way or a fair balance between maritime crimes and their 
punishments, and to fix for each case the adequate mitigation procedures needed for 
drafting or amending existing legislation. The incidents or events linked to the 
transportation of contraband goods, drugs and stowaways could move easily from 
less to more or be classed in the middle of the spectrum according to the case. For 
instance, a stowaway could be an economic migrant, asylum seeker, and refugee or 
in the worst case a criminal or terrorist, implying different conventions, risks, threats, 
mitigation and preventive measures, resulting in various forms of punishments. This 
is one of the reasons that few countries have adopted harmonized procedures or 
unified rules to deal with those issues or did not ratify particular international 
instruments conflicting with their interests and existing policy. 
 
           Therefore, the analysis of a sort of continuum of the nature and form of the 
maritime crime or criminal offence is necessary. This continuum starts with 
prevention, followed by the incident or event corresponding to a crime or criminal 
offence, then followed by mitigation and ending with sanctions, fines or other 
remedies depending on the case itself 54 , as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The Maritime crime continuum55
                                                 
54 Criminal offences and regulatory offences are different under penal law, the spectrum highlights their 
location. It permits the prediction of countermeasures needed for mitigation if the preventive measures fail. 
55 This figure has been inspired by MLAW 301, lecture handouts on “Penal Law, Advanced Issues in Public 
and Private Maritime Law” of Professor Proshanto K. Mukherjee, WMU, (March, 2007). 
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 The transportation of contraband goods or the smuggling of various devices 
could be simply prohibited items falling under a breach of customs provisions, 
whereas human trafficking, drugs offences, criminals or terrorists may involve 
various agencies or institutions at all levels, making the global picture more complex 
to the legislator or policy maker. However, if as an example, nuclear devices are 
smuggled on board a ship or loaded into a container to be shipped to another port 
facility, the risks and consequences are not the same. The nature and form of the 
crime or criminal offences are subject to different sanctions, penalties or fines 
according to the case, involving different conventions, rules and regulations as they 
move on the spectrum from less to more highly violent maritime acts. Therefore, a 
question arises as to the potential consequences for the crew, ship and the 
environment if the intention is to harm56. A risk assessment is needed to thoroughly 
analyze their impacts and to find the most appropriate measures to be implemented57.  
 
            The same thinking applies for stowaways, from a normal free passage 
seeker to a criminal or terrorist striving to get on board for other reasons and using 
the ship as a weapon, taking hostages and attempting to strand the vessel. The 
consequences are not the same and it is very difficult for the legislator or policy 
maker to predict all possible scenarios and preventive measures to be implemented 
in the national law or to ensure adequate and sufficient mitigation procedures are 
available and in place. Here, also a move from a normal situation to a catastrophic 
scenario, changes the spectrum and continuum described above.  
 
             Finally, a rational approach to the subject is necessary to find the gaps 
existing in the legislation and gathering of information for policy and cost/benefit 
analysis58. The spectrum and continuum of crimes are needed and very useful for 
drafting legislation on criminal law and particularly in adopting new policy or 
                                                 
56 See Kenneth G. Hawkes, Maritime Security, Maryland: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989 at pp.9-15. 
57 Supra, footnote 35 at p.9, ISPS Code fixes the security levels in terms of the threat and provides the 
appropriate measures to mitigate the risks and consequences. An analogy with the spectrum and continuum 
on crimes is easily done. ISPS Code Part A Section 2.1.9, 10 and 11, and Part B Section 4.8,9,10,11,12,13. 
58 See David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, Policy analysis: concepts and practice, 3rd ed., (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1999), at pp.41-42 and pp.296-310.  
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 amending existing instruments59. Therefore, an overall appreciation on the subject 
from the legal perspectives is needed to bring into light the salient features of these 
international conventions, dealing with maritime crimes and enforcement regimes. 
 
The third point to be highlighted and discussed is related to the criminal 
jurisdiction under UNCLOS 82 with emphasis on the maritime zones, and 
jurisdictional issues on transnational and international crimes60. 
 
2.3.2 International crimes and the maritime community 
 
 Numerous crimes against international law are regulated by treaty61 . In 
many cases, they are prosecutable before international courts or tribunals, such as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)62, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS)63 and International Criminal Court (ICC)64. First, sovereign States have 
jurisdiction over their territories allowing them to prosecute the offender and 
enforcing the law. However, this process is restricted to their territorial borders. 
                                                 
59 See Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maritime Legislation, Malmö, World Maritime University (WMU), 2002 at 
pp.74-81 regarding the drafting process, drafting instructions and the different steps involved in the process. 
Also, “the language used for drafting is very important for understanding and to be understood” as 
mentioned by the author. 
60 Supra, footnote 43 at p.10, see p.883 and p.887, on organized crime and transnational organized crime 
issues, and their differences regarding the salient elements or main characteristics of these forms of crimes 
and shared features, such as that both are profit-motivated and profit-driven. The drug trafficking and abuse 
phenomenon as crimes against social interests, areas of problems, the need of cooperation and new 
strategies have been highlighted. The duty to prosecute or extradite the perpetrator raised complex issues on 
modalities available and the effectiveness of related existing enforcement regimes. 
61 See art.2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 stipulating that “ treaty” means “an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation”.  
62  See art.36(2) of ICJ related to the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the 
interpretation of a treaty, any subject of international law, established facts constituting a breach of an 
international obligation and the  system of reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation. 
63 The tribunal is open to States Parties to the LOSC, 1982, according to art.291, §1 and the entities as 
referred in art.305, §1(c) to (f), and as stipulated in the Statute of the tribunal in art.20, §1. The tribunal has 
jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the convention, as mentioned in 
LOSC, 1982, art.288, 297, 298 and under its Statute, art.21 and 22. The applicable law is stipulated in 
art.293. < http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html>,  (June, 2007). 
64 See ICC Statute, art.5 for the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of ICC. The Rome Statute entered into 
force on 1st July 2002. 
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 Given that States have complete legislative, executive and judicial competence 
within their borders65, it can be implied that State parties to UNCLOS do implement 
the convention effectively and their national legislation shall meet the standards as 
defined in it. However, it is apparent that several disputes have arisen worldwide 
regarding the application and enforcement of domestic laws related to maritime 
crimes committed on board foreign flag ships while in territorial waters of a State66. 
The case of the M/V “Saiga” 67  is an appropriate example which highlights the 
difficulties generated by breaches of international law.  
 
 Secondly, it can be deduced that new challenges have come into the picture 
which were not considered previously, such as the creation of an international legal 
order dealing with all criminal matters, permitting an effective implementation 
process and ensuring that adequate controls are in place to obtain harmonization and 
unification of rules worldwide and accepted by all States. The end results could only 
benefit the international community and sovereign States in providing efficient tools 
to reduce claims and disputes at all levels.   
 
 Thirdly, another aspect to be considered is that a violation of international 
law attributable to a State falls under the umbrella of State Responsibility68. The laws 
governing State Responsibility and criminal law are divergent in relation to the 
                                                 
65Supra, footnote 50 at p.12, see p.115. Because State sovereignty is restricted to its territory, the exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction of a State’s courts is also correspondingly restricted. 
66 In 1998, a joint International Working Group was established and includes in addition to the CMI, 
BIMCO, ICS, INTERPOL, IGP&I, ICC-IMB, ITF, IUMI and UNOLA/DOALOS to tackle all issues on 
piracy, robbery at sea, maritime violent acts and maritime crimes. They were charged with drafting a Model 
National Law concerning these threats and providing effective measures to suppress the lack of uniformity 
in national laws observed worldwide. Also, the Group is in charge to find appropriate solutions regarding 
incidents taking place within or just outside waters under coastal State jurisdiction.  
67 See ITLOS, press release 10, 14, 21 and 23 for the details and the different disputes involved, and 
comments on the case. The 1st July 1999, the tribunal declared that Guinea violated the rights of Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines in arresting M/V “Saiga” and consequently the victim countries were awarded 
compensation Also, it allotted compensation for the crew, confiscated cargo and the damage to the vessel. 
The tribunal stated that “Guinea had used excessive force when arresting the ship”.  
< http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html>,  (May, 2007). 
68 See International Law Commission (ILC), “Yearbook 2000 ”, Volume I, (Geneva:  United Nations (UN), 
2005), at pp.72-92. <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_2000_v1_e.pdf , 
(June, 2007). 
18 
 sanctions, because the legal consequences under the law of State responsibility69 
aspire only to re-establish a conflicting situation into a normal one by ensuring 
conformity with the prevailing international law. In contrast, sanctions in 
international criminal law are of a punitive and preventive nature70. 
 
 Domestic legislation is the basis for prosecution and punishment of 
maritime crimes under international law. Where the crime is treaty based, States 
parties are obliged to declare the offences as criminal71. Crimes against maritime 
navigation could be assimilated in this category.  The fundamental principles of the 
rule of law are that criminal law must start with an enactment by a competent and 
recognized body creating a criminal offence. The process is done by most countries 
by enacting these laws pursuant to their Constitution and enumerating the crimes in a 
Criminal Code or Penal Code or type of Statute, and disseminating the information 
for publication through the appropriate diplomatic channels.  
 
 Finally, the maritime community must be aware of those instruments 
regarding claims or disputes which could arise, keeping in mind that international 
crimes are subject to sovereign States’ prerogatives with respect to prosecution and 
punishment; they may have a potent and disruptive chain reaction on the whole 
maritime sector. State responsibility is concerned with the definition, classification 
and control of those crimes within its jurisdictions, according to the prevailing laws 
and policies. 
                                                 
69  See James Crawford and Pierre Bodeau and Jacqueline Peel, “The ILC’s Draft articles on State 
Responsibility: toward completion of as second reading”, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol.94, No.4, (October, 2000), at pp.660-674. < http://www.jstor.org/cgi-bin/jstor/printpage/ 00029300 
/di011875/01p00047/0.pdf?backcontext=page&dowhat=Acrobat&config=jstor&userID=c3b2f7a3@mah.se
/01cc99331f00501c11e97&0.pdf >, (June, 2007). 
70 See Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Law Regime, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at pp.73-74. International Criminal Law, State rights and 
responsibilities come into the arena when dealing with international crimes. According to the author, the 
most important actors for prosecuting international crimes are National Courts. See Rome Statute art.1, 
which stipulates that “ The most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, must 
not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking all appropriate measures 
at national level and by enhancing international cooperation”. 
71 See Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, (The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, 2005) at 
pp.34-42. 
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 2.3.3 The scope of transnational maritime crimes: a dilemma for policy 
makers? 
 
Nowadays, transnational organized crime72 is a major threat to society and 
trade worldwide73. It is an invisible cancer spreading on a large scale its symptoms, 
resulting in a  “complex phenomenon and manifesting itself in numerous  activities, 
such as, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in firearms,  
smuggling of migrants, money laundering, corruption etc.”74 It is evident that one of 
the principal illegal activities carried out by organized crime syndicates is drug 
trafficking, generating enormous profit 75 . The situation is worsening with the 
increase of trade and globalization. Thus, States are attempting to grapple with   
these sensitive issues by seeking new remedies to counter the threats. However, 
international criminals continue to cross borders of countries and violate national 
sovereignties, even though many States are trying to find adequate solutions through 
international and regional agreements to combat criminal activities which are a 
menace to all transportation sectors, land, air or sea76.  
 
Consequently, various security concerns relate to transnational crimes 
emerged and legislators or policy makers have to contend with this new dilemma. 
Criminal activities connected to the sea are transnational in most cases and fall under 
the umbrella of maritime crimes discussed in the previous paragraphs. To further the 
debate regarding transnational maritime crimes, a scrutiny of the international law on 
jurisdiction concepts is necessary to address this nexus, because it provides the basis 
                                                 
72 See art.2 (a) regarding the definition adopted for “Organized criminal group” in the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 and its three Protocols for additional information. 
73 See UNODC, “Results of a pilot survey of forty selected organized criminal groups in sixteen countries”, 
Report on the Global Programme against Transnational Organized Crime, Vienna, UNODC, (September, 
2002), < http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdf >, (June,2007). 
74 Features of organized crime and objectives of UNODC to combat and countering this threat are described 
on the world web site < http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized_crime.html > , (June,2007). 
75 Ibid. 
76  See Doug Mackinnon, “Transnational dimensions of maritime crime”, paper presented at the  
Transnational  Crime Conference , Australian Institute of Criminology in association with the Australian 
Federal Police and Australian Customs Service held in Canberra, 9-10 March 2000, Australian Institute of 
Criminology,2006, < http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/transnational/mackinnon.html>, (May.2007), at 
pp.1-10. Overviews of criminal activities at sea and law enforcement practices are highlighted and some 
solutions given on how to deal with the different issues involved. 
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 for maritime law enforcement activities and procedures. The following is an analysis 
of the concept of jurisdiction77. 
 
- There are three kinds of jurisdictions: 
• Legislative, 
• Executive, and 
• Judicial  
 
- The general principles on which a State may base its jurisdiction are78:  
• territoriality Principle 
• nationality Principle  
• universality Principle  
• passive Personality Principle 
• protective Principle, and 
• representational Principle79 which is relatively new.  
 
At the national level, criminal law is confined within the State’s territory, 
meaning the principle of sovereignty prevails. However, the power of national 
criminal law outside its jurisdiction is limited, in relation to the different mechanisms 
existing under international instruments. The territoriality principle80 recognizes that 
a State may proscribe conduct in its sovereign territory 81 . Thus, States favor 
exercising jurisdiction themselves, and avoid being bound by or dependent on other 
States regarding issues related to criminal matters and the State’s jurisdiction to 
                                                 
77 Supra, footnote 70 at p.19; see at pp.75-76 and p.101 for the “traditional” principles of jurisdiction. 
78 Supra, footnote 50 at p.12, see at p.115. “Denmark legislation provides that a Danish citizen committing 
a crime abroad, in the territory of a foreign State, only Denmark will have jurisdiction and could punish 
him if the conduct is recognized as a crime in the State where this behavior took place”. 
79 Ibid., see at p.117. It is mentioned that “States may have jurisdiction over offences committed abroad in 
particular cases where they have chosen not to follow a request of extradition of the perpetrator to another 
State. Instead of extradition it is decided to “represent” the requesting States in a prosecution of its own 
where this State has no independent reason for jurisdiction to hear the case”. The advantages of this 
principle are that it reduces time for prosecution and costs in case of extradition and preserve the interests 
of the requiring State.    
80 Ibid., see at p.116, “Subjective territoriality applies when a material element of an offence occurs within 
the territory, objective territoriality applies when a significant effect of an offence impacts on the asserting 
State’s territory, thus conduct outside the territory that is intended to have impact in the territory also allows 
for jurisdiction”. These notions given by the author highlight the two possibilities regarding territorial 
issues and their impacts on national legislation. 
81 Supra, footnote 70, at p.19. A State has jurisdiction over its territory and domestic law applies.  
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 adjudicate. Every sovereign State enjoys the autonomy to deliver judgments on 
matters that contain no extra State ingredients and this right comes directly from the 
international law82. R. v Cumberworth (Adrian David)83 .Regarding the nationality 
principle84, two notions come into the picture. First, regarding the active personality 
theory, the nationality of the offender is decisive in the granting of jurisdiction. “It 
entails jurisdictions over crimes committed by a State’s nationals abroad”.85 This 
notion permits a State to prohibit and condemn the criminal conduct of its citizens in 
a foreign country and highlights the effect of domestic law operating outside the 
State’s territory. Secondly, the passive nationality principle is invoked in very few 
cases, mainly, when a “State claims for its citizen abroad as the victim of a crime and 
the accommodating State can not granted sufficient protection, security and  safety or 
the victim’s life is endangered”86. The difference between them is that the active 
nationality principle concerns a perpetrator, whereas passive is related to a victim. 
The protective principle can bring a solution in cases in which the violation of a 
State’s interests justifies the claim for jurisdiction. It is the case when aliens commit 
acts against the security or independence of a State87. Examples of acts falling under 
crimes are hijacking, killing citizens and terrorists’ activities. These offences could 
lead to the use of this principle. Also, the nationality of the perpetrator or the 
territoriality principle is irrelevant in the context of this notion. The passive 
                                                 
82 See Conny Rijken, Trafficking in persons: prosecution from a European perspective, Hague: T.M.C 
Asser Press, 2003, at pp.34-36.  
83 R. v Cumberworth (Adrian David) (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 187 Times, May 8, 1989 WL 651464.This case 
highlights the notion of jurisdiction , where a foreign ship is in extraterritorial waters and an offence  is 
committed by a British subject on board a French ship in French waters. “The M.V. Chartres, a French 
vessel, was at Dieppe with her ramp down. Youths from Sussex, including C caused fighting on board and 
was arrested on arrival at Newhaven. It was submitted that the Crown Court at Lewes had no jurisdiction to 
try C because the alleged offence had been committed in a foreign port when the ship was still berthed. 
Held, dismissing C's appeal on this point, that (1) the ship had not been fixed to the land in Dieppe with any 
degree of permanence; (2) in any event, all that was necessary for the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 s. 686(1) 
to be effective to give jurisdiction was for the ship to be foreign and for C to be a British subject on board 
who did not belong to that ship. (It might have been different if the ship had been dry-docked or hauled up 
on to the shore)”. < http://international.westlaw.com/ > , (June, 2007).  
84 Supra, footnote 82 at p.22, see at p.38. 
85 Supra, footnote 50 at p.12, see at p.116. 
86 Supra, footnote 82 at p.22, see at p.39. 
87 Ibid., at p.39. The protection of victims of crimes abroad is vital, mainly when a State’s citizens are the 
victims and the perpetrators are aliens. In such cases, State interests and practices enter the arena. 
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 personality principle comes into play when a “State applies its criminal law for 
extraterritorial offences against its nationals as individuals also when the perpetrator 
is an alien”88. Finally, the universality principle applies to crimes that are a menace 
to the whole international community of States in such a way that all nations may 
both proscribe and punish its occurrence. The nationality of the offender or the 
location of the offence is irrelevant. This principle refers to crimes that are defined in 
the international instruments and are criminalized and punishable according to the 
legislation in force in these States. Universal jurisdiction over piracy, slavery and 
war crimes falls under this category. 
2.3.4  Maritime zones and criminal jurisdiction under UNCLOS 82 
 
 Maritime jurisdictions and enforcement regimes regarding the transportation 
of contraband, illicit narcotics and stowaway issues are extremely complex, 
particularly with regard to boundary delimitations89 , transnational offences90 , the 
location of the offence, and the nationality of the ship associated with the event, the 
nationality of the crew or offender and the nature of the offence. The exercise of 
State jurisdiction91 is related to all factors described before and varies with the type 
of jurisdiction involved. Flag States exercise jurisdiction over ships flying its flag, 
whereas coastal States over waters under their national jurisdiction and port States 
over ships entering their internal waters92. 
                                                 
88 Supra, footnote 50 at p.12, see at p.116, “This theory is not supported much by the international 
community, because it conflicts with domestic matters and has been successfully invoked only in domestic 
courts”. 
89 See Adel Omar Alsied, “Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries with special reference to the EEZ and the 
IMO Conventions regime: A Libyan Case Study”, United Nations - The Nippon Foundation Fellow, (June, 
2006), at pp.17-21. < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/ 
fellows_ papers/alsied_0506_libya.pdf >, (June 24, 2007). 
90 Neil Boister, Transnational Criminal Law? , Vol.14, No.5, The European Journal of International Law 
(EIJL, 2003), at pp.953-976. < http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/14/5/953.pdf >, (June 24, 2007). 
91 See Andree Kirchner, Public International Law (VAK 06-009), Master Programme in European and 
International Law, (Stockholm, 2005), at pp.1-21. < http://mlecture.uni-bremen.de/intern/ ws2005_2006 / 
fb06 /vak-06-009/20051124/folien.pdf > , (June 22, 2007).” State jurisdiction is the power of a State under 
international law to prescribe rules and the authority to enforce judgments made in accordance with them.” 
92 See UNCLOS 82, articles 8,9(g),21(h),25,27,28,33,42,52,94(1)(2),98(1)(2),99, and 100 to 108,110, 111, 
127 and 128. 
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  In internal waters 93 , the territoriality principle prevails. A ship remains 
subject to flag State jurisdiction regardless of its location. However, by the act of 
entering internal waters, a ship places itself within port State jurisdiction. In some 
countries, it has complete jurisdiction, in others; it only assumes a right to 
jurisdiction. The Port State may exercise jurisdiction if the offence affects the peace, 
security or good order, on the request of the master or flag State and if the offence 
involves a non –crew member of the vessel, such as a “stowaway”94.  
 
 In the territorial seas 95 , the coastal State’s criminal jurisdiction can be 
extended to the outer limit of the territorial sea. Flag State jurisdiction prevails as 
well as enforcement jurisdiction for offences involving stowaways, violations of 
custom and immigration regulations96, and illicit traffic in drugs. These criminal 
offences are clear reasons for intervention.  
 
 In respect of the contiguous zone, which extends beyond the territorial sea, 
the enforcement of customs, fiscal and sanitary regulations are allowed, but in the 
EEZ and the continental shelf, the right of hot pursuit97 is permitted, whereas in the 
high seas, vessels engaged in piracy are subject to universal jurisdiction and hot 
pursuit. Cooperation between States is encouraged in the suppression of illicit drug 
trafficking98. 
                                                 
93 See R. R .Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed., Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1999, at pp.60-65. “Coastal States enjoy full territorial sovereignty over its internal waters, no right 
of innocent passage”. However, the right of access to ports and other internal waters depends on State 
practice and is often a subject of controversy when it comes to the State interests. The notion of ship in 
distress is also a dilemma. If criminals are on board and human life is at risk, and the safety and security are 
compromised, a ship may be refused to access or enter a port /port facilities by a coastal State for many 
reasons and the customary law right of entry may be denied, even though the ship is considered in distress. 
As example, terrorists or criminals are taking the crew in hostage on board a foreign vessel in coastal State 
internal waters. Complex scenarios come into the picture and various unpredictable consequences may 
result.  See, Cunard S.S. Co. v.  Mellon  262 U.S.100, 43 S.Ct.504 U.S. 1923, for coastal State’s jurisdiction. 
94 See B.A.H. Parritt, Crime at Sea, A practical guide, London: The Nautical Institute, 1996 at p.23. 
95 Supra, footnote 93; see at pp.94-100 and LOSC, articles 21,24,25,26 and 27. “The Law of the Sea 
Convention provides for the enforcement of general criminal jurisdiction in some circumstances, under 
article27, and the existence of general enforcement jurisdiction clearly presupposes the existence of general 
legislative jurisdiction”. See United States v. Flores 289 U.S.137, 53S.Ct.580, 77 L.Ed.1086,1933 A.M.C.649. 
96Supra, footnote 50 at p.12; see p.121 and LOSC, articles 19(g) and 27. 
97 See LOSC, art. 33, controls done by a coastal State in the contiguous zone and art.111,right of hot pursuit. 
98 See LOSC, art. 100 to 107 and 110,111 for piracy provisions, and art.108 related to illicit drug trafficking. 
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 In UNCLOS 82, three categories of violent maritime criminal acts are considered: 
1. Transport of slaves, as stipulated in art.99, is prohibited and effective measures must be 
implemented for prevention and punishment99 .Also, any slave found on board a ship is 
immediately free. 
2. Drug trafficking, as stipulated in art.108, is illicit and must be suppressed on the high seas; 
cooperation with other States is suggested100. 
3. High seas piracy, as stipulated in the articles 100 to 107 and 110.101 
  
With respect to drug trafficking, a review of the three conventions is necessary 
for assessing all the risks involved in the transportation of contraband goods or 
smuggling on board ships. Also, other instruments published by UNODC102, related 
to crimes and transnational offences associated with illicit drugs must be considered.   
1. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol103. 
2. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971104. 
3. Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988105. 
                                                 
99 UNCLOS 82, in art.99 stipulates, “Every State shall take effective measures to prevent and punish the 
transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that 
purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, whatever its flag, shall ipso facto be free”. 
100 See UNODC , United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Drug control treaties: Single Convention on 
Narcotics,1961;the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 and the Convention against the illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,1988, which are complementary international 
conventions to be taken into account with UNCLOS,art.108,  
< http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug_and_crime_conventions.html> , (April 5, 2007). 
101 These articles deal mainly with all issues related to piracy, such as cooperation in repression of piracy on 
the high seas or any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, the right of hot pursuit in case of 
violation of laws and regulations of that State, and such pursuit must begin in the internal waters or 
territorial seas and may extend to the high seas if the pursuit is not interrupted. 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf >, (April 3, 2007). 
102 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime which is mandated to assist member States in the struggle 
against illicit drugs, crimes, terrorism, money laundering and corruption. 
103Ibid., see Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,  
< http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf>, (March 15, 2007). “Its aim is to combat drug abuse 
by coordinated international action. It limits the possession, use, and trade in, distribution, import, export, 
manufacture and production of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. It combats drug 
trafficking through international cooperation to deter and discourage drug traffickers”. 
104Supra, footnote100, see Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, 
< http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf  >, (March 15, 2007). “The Convention establishes 
an international control system for psychotropic substances. It responded to the diversification and 
expansion of the spectrum of drugs of abuse and introduced controls over a number of synthetic drugs 
according to their abuse potential on the one hand and their therapeutic value on the other”. 
105 Supra, footnote 100; see Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1988, < http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf >, (March 15, 2007).  
“It provides comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, provisions against money laundering, 
diversion of precursor chemicals and provides for international cooperation through extradition of drug 
traffickers, controlled deliveries and transfer of proceedings”. 
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    For stowaways, drugs and transportation of contraband goods, the review of 
related issues and relevant international instruments 106  on organized crime and 
transnational organized crime have highlighted the urgent needs for framing 
legislation at national levels for States to tackle the core of the problems. 
 
The fourth point to be expounded in this debate is related to the perception of 
maritime crimes in the Maghreb and to identify the gaps in the existing legal 
instruments needing amendments and their impacts on policy. 
 
2.4 Maritime Crimes in the Maghreb arena: a call for reforms? 
 
 
The source of law was customary law in the Maghreb until the founding of 
the French colonies. Except for Islamic law which applied to matrimonial matters, 
French statutory law was applied in North Africa until these three countries (Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia) became independent. However, “ijtihad”, case law in Islamic 
jurisprudence is widely used in that region. For example, in Algeria after 1975, 
French jurisprudence was abolished, but case law jurisprudence was re-established. 
The judicial system in the Maghreb is steeped in the civil law tradition; however, it 
has been considerably influenced by the Islamic legal system and has entrenched in it, 
local customs and traditions. Penal Codes and Codes of Criminal Procedure are the 
legal tools available to combat crimes in which are stipulated punishments or 
sanctions according to the law in force107.  
 
The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which is a regional body, was created to 
foster a common approach to deal with shared problems and challenges. Due to 
incompatible interests of the different States involved, the goal of collectively 
                                                 
106 See the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 and its three Protocols 
for technical aspects and requirements related to the enumerated threats, such as smuggling or trafficking. 
107 Algerian Maritime Code (AMC), Law No.98/05 of 25th June 1998, modifying and completing the 
Ordinance No.76/80 of the 23rd October 1976, creation of the Maritime Code, maritime crimes and offences 
are mentioned in art.479 to 556 of this Code. 
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 grappling with common threats is still in its nascent stage. Hence, the law and policy 
regarding maritime crimes in those countries do not converge. This poses the biggest 
challenge for combating the menace and provides compulsion for policy 
responsiveness to find a balance between the different interests involved and the 
appropriate legal reforms. 
 
The four points discussed so far were designed to be precursors to the 
analysis that will follow in the subsequent chapter. In sum, this chapter has 
highlighted the difficulties regarding the definitions of maritime crimes 108  in 
different jurisdictions109. It also points out weaknesses and the deficiencies in the 
existing legal framework and the policy needed to combat the threat adequately. It 
also highlights the divergent views of scholars on the subject110. 
 
 
 The reader will in the next chapter be exposed to an incisive analysis of the 
transportation of stowaways, illicit drugs and contraband goods, followed by a 
scrutiny of the various international instruments associated with the above matters. A 
comparison with the domestic legislation of the Maghreb States will be made to 
propose solutions for effective policy formulation and framing of legislation. 
 
 
                                                 
108 See the Australian Crimes at Sea Act 2000 as amended at p.11 regarding the definition of criminal act at 
sea and at p.18 for the definition of maritime offence, meaning an offence against a law that applies in the 
adjacent area for a State under this scheme. See also on the subject Max Q. Mejia, “Maritime 
Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in defining piracy, terrorism and other acts of maritime violence”, Journal of 
International Commercial law, 2(2), Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003, at pp.153-175. 
109 See European University Institute (EUI), “The Relationship between “General Principles” and Custom 
in  International Criminal Law”, working group on international criminal law, meeting of 22 November 
2006, Florence: European University Institute Law Department,2006 at pp.1-16. The group highlighted that 
general principles and custom are clearly distinguished concepts in international criminal law. 
110 These difficulties are caused by the differences on the perception of the concept and definition of crime 
in various jurisdictions. A crime reflects both the general public’s basic concerns and public policy, and 
therefore is an extremely difficult concept, because it varies according to time, place and circumstances. 
Many scholars have different views on the subject and thereby create a complex debate on the notion of 
maritime crime, offences and crimes. However, crime and criminal law is affected by public policy. 
Therefore, policy formulation is an important matter for legislators. See also Proshanto K. Mukherjee, 
“Implementation of Maritime Conventions and Legislation Development”, lecture handout MLP403, 
Maritime Law & Policy course, Malmö: World Maritime University, 2007. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE JUXTAPOSITION OF CURRENT  INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND MAGHREB LEGISLATORS 
 “An unjust law is itself a species of violence. Arrest for its breach is more so. ”- 
  “Mahatma” Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Indian Hindu nationalist leader, 1869-1948 
 
 
 
3.1 The transportation of stowaways by sea: the Maghreb case 
 
 In view of the latest data published by IMO111, the problem of stowaways has 
increased in the Maghreb region and is getting worse worldwide112. Even though the 
ISPS Code has been implemented113, port facilities and ships continue to face this 
old threat, highlighted by new concerns on human suffering, refugees, migrants and 
asylum seekers, and involving complex issues, such as criminality and terrorism, 
threatening the whole transportation system in the Mediterranean Sea. The 
                                                 
111Supra, footnote 1 at p.1, IMO published the annual statistics for the year 2006 and highlighted 657 
stowaway cases, but the analysis was based on 244 stowaway incidents, their location on board ships, the 
places of embarkation and attempted disembarkation, the nationality of the offenders, the flag States of the 
ships involved, type of ship and duration of embarkation, according to the reports submitted to the 
Organization up to 31 December 2006. See FAL.2/Circ.102 for the previous statistics and the 
FAL.2/Circ.103 for the period of January to April 2007, where 93 incidents were reported, involving 298 
stowaways, 29 cases are from the Maghreb region, Morocco (18 cases ; 6,04%), Algeria (7 cases ; 2,35%), 
Tunisia (4 cases ; 1,34%), for Mauritania and Libya  no data are available for the cited period. See 
Appendix D for the charts and different trends for the Maghreb region.  
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18743/103.pdf >, (June 20, 2007). 
112 See European University Institute (EUI), The Relationship between “General Principles” and Custom” 
in  International Criminal Law, working group on international criminal law, meeting of 22 November 
2006, Florence: European University Institute Law Department,2006 at pp.1-16. An increase of stowaways 
boarding was noted for the year 2006, creating new concerns on existing enforcement regimes in different 
States worldwide. A particular attention to the Maghreb’s situation was highlighted as a result of numerous 
drowning cases reported to the coastal States and media, and where various attempts to reach the European 
coasts ended  in a human tragedy. 
113 ISPS Code is in force since 1st July 2004, imposing new measures to secure the shipping activity, IMO 
guidelines to assist States in the implementation efforts have been published, but the standards adopted in 
many States are not harmonized and lack in effective implementation has been observed. Poor policies and 
gaps in national legislation have been reported.     
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 resurrection of the notion of “harragas”114 for the Maghreb inhabitants or “Boat 
people” for the Europeans during the recent years in North Africa, reveals the 
challenge and drama faced by these coastal States, regarding the new wave of threats, 
such as young people trying to get free passage on board commercial ships or using 
small boats to reach the southern parts of Europe, called by them the “fortress” and 
“El Dorado”115.  The Maghreb countries are considered transit zones for migrants 
trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea, particularly in ferries trading on regular lines 
or long distance carriers. However, the picture is more complicated with regard to the 
phenomenon of illegal migration, because the flow of internal displaced persons 
(IDPs) or undocumented migrants crossing borders and waiting in temporary zones 
within countries of this region are generally grouped, then regrouped or moved 
momentarily to other places without correct statistics on the number of persons 
concerned116. All these factors affect the data on attempted stowaway or stowaway 
purely as defined by the international instruments. The increased number of migrants 
involved in this dangerous adventure, threatening the sea trade is the main concern of 
the Maghreb States, given the fact that reports reveal that most of the policies 
                                                 
114 The term harraga means in Arabic getting free passage by any kind of transportation in traveling from 
one place to another, using unauthorized routes and means to finalize this intended voyage. See the official 
Algerian newspaper Le Soir D’Algérie (February 25, 2007), describing the nature and form of the problem 
raised by these new threats, ending in numerous dead and drowned of stowaways or free passage seekers 
from the East coast of Algeria or Tunisia, trying to reach Sardinia, Sicily, Isle of Lampedusa and Malta in 
small boats overloaded or capsizing in bad weather. The same phenomenon is reported on the West coast of 
Algeria and Morocco, but the destination is South Spain, Isles of Baleares or France. A tragedy without 
witnesses and far away from the international preoccupation is still occurring and bringing its list of dead ,  
<http://www.lesoirdalgerie.com/articles/2007/02/25/article.php?sid=50038&cid=2>, (June20, 2007).     
115 Dreams of leaving, unemployment, social conditions and harsh environment push more and more 
candidates to this deadly adventure. El Dorado is a Spanish term meaning “Golden region”. This legend 
began in the 1530s, in the Andes (Colombia) and is still incrusted in the popular thinking in the ex-Spanish 
colonies. Northern parts of Morocco and western parts of Algeria which were colonized by the Spanish 
Empire in the past centuries and the local inhabitants have a popular believe that is strongly influenced by 
this myth. Migration to find a new El Dorado is an honor for tribe members, trying to get incomes for their 
relatives as long misery and unemployment is threatening the survival of their relatives. Therefore, boat 
people concept or stowaways are not condemned by the local society, but is encouraged at all levels as long 
as incomes and other opportunities are concerned. 
116 See IOM, “Migration Initiatives Appeal 2007”, Report, (Geneva: IOM, 2007) at pp. 23-26. Also, the 
reports published by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), highlighted the 
dramatic issue of trafficking in human beings, smuggling and the relationship between illegal migration and 
criminal networks, thus revealing poor policy in the transit and sending countries and their consequences in 
the receiving States. 
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 regarding these matters are laissez-faire and compounded by lack of effective 
countermeasures to eliminate this menace. 
  
 In this regard, the first point that would be examined in this chapter relates to 
the analysis of the trends, main areas of concern, types of stowaways, root causes and 
consequences, and risks involved regarding the threats.  
3.1.1 The analysis of stowaway trends and migration flows  
 
 IMO reported in April 2007117 that from January 1998 to April 2007, the total 
number of stowaway incidents so far is 2,815 involving 8,593 stowaways. From 
January to April 2007, the total number of stowaway incidents reported to the 
Organization is 93 incidents involving 298 stowaways. This data is related to 
worldwide incidents and concerns only reports emanating from member States. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that this data must be viewed carefully when 
analyzing the trends, because every State tries to minimize the number of incidents 
and does not report the attempted stowaway cases which may bring to light other 
factors not considered in previous analyses. Therefore, a pragmatic approach is 
necessary in considering the findings regarding these trends.  
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Figure 5:   Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO): From 2001 to April 2007 (Worldwide)  
                                                 
117 See IMO, “Reports on Stowaway Incidents”, (January to April 2007), FAL.2 Circ.103 (24 April 2007) at 
pp.1-24. <http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18743/103.pdf>, (July 5, 2007). 
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  As can be seen from Figure 5, a steady decline occurred from 2000 to 2005. 
This downward trend is mainly due to the implementation of the ISPS Code, which 
entered into force on 1st July 2004 and amendments to the FAL Convention 118  
adopted in January 2002, and entered into force in 2003. However, a gradual climb 
from 2005 to July 2007 is observed, confirming the increase of stowaway cases 
worldwide, particularly in certain regions, such as the Maghreb. In view of the above, 
a comparative chart is given below to indicate the current trends observed in the 
Maghreb region119. 
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Figure 6:          Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO): From 2001 to April 2007 (Maghreb Region) 
 
 It can be seen from Figure 6, that from 2001 to 2005 a steady decrease 
occurred, but from 2005 to 2006, there was a gradual climb. By analyzing the 
different trends for the year 2007, it is projected to rise steadily. Figure 5 when 
                                                 
118 See the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965 as amended. Amendments 
concern mainly the incorporation of standards and recommended practices on dealing with stowaways. 
“These standards are internationally agreed measures which are necessary and practicable in order to 
facilitate international maritime traffic and recommended practices as measures the application of which is 
desirable” as mentioned by this convention. They are also found in the Resolution A.871 (20) adopted on 
27 November 1997,” Guidelines on the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful Resolution of 
Stowaways Cases”, establishing basic principles to be applied in dealing with stowaways. Also, the two 
circulars FAL.2Circ.50 and FAL.2.Circ.50 Rev.1 are relevant regarding this issue. They invite member 
States to provide the Organization with information on stowaway’s incidents. As result of these reports 
provided to IMO, quarterly reports on stowaways and statistics are done and recommendations issued.   
119 See Annex E for detailed charts by Maghreb State, regarding the Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO) for 
the main ports of Algeria and Morocco. These two countries have the highest number of stowaway 
incidents, according to the latest data publish by the Facilitation Committee of IMO. Casablanca for 
Morocco and Algiers for Algeria are the main ports presenting an increased risk with regard to stowaways. 
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 compared with Figure 6 reveals the same tendency of the trends. From these graphs, 
it may be concluded that the same movements are observed and after the year 2004, 
even though the ISPS Code has been implemented, the general trend is upward 
regarding the number of stowaway incidents and persons involved. In view of these 
findings, a detailed chart by Maghreb State is given below to reveal the present 
trends and to bring to light the factors contributing to this threat.  
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Figure 7: Annual Stowaway Statistics by Maghreb State (IMO), places of embarkation
  
 As can be seen from Figure 7, Algeria had a dramatic increase in 2006 and 
Tunisia a gradual climb for the same period. Morocco did not have a significant 
change regarding the number of stowaways. It can be concluded that these three 
countries in view of the different trends120 still have a prevalence of incidents and the 
menace is confirmed by the analysis of different graphs, which highlight the 
occurrence in recent years. The study of these trends revealed the main ports of 
concern, such as Algiers, Arzew and Skikda for Algeria, and Casablanca, Agadir and 
Safi for Morocco. In Tunisia, two additional ports, Tunis and Rades ports, previously 
not considered in the data of IMO, were included. The main types of ships boarded in 
this region by stowaways are essentially Ro-Ro cargo ships, ferries, container ships 
and general cargo ships. Recently, the use of pleasure craft, fishing vessels and other 
                                                 
120 See Annexes C, D, E and F for the different trends observed regarding stowaways and attempted 
stowaways worldwide and from the Maghreb region. 
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 types of ships for the transportation of stowaways or illegal migrants by sea is 
increasingly observed in the Mediterranean Sea, and particularly in the Maghreb 
region. However, these categories falling out of the scope of international 
instruments are contributing factors to the menace and should be considered as an 
imperative by policy makers, and efforts should be exerted to tackle the phenomenon 
in its totality. 
 
 The stowaways from the Maghreb region appear to target the following 
destinations:  
• Europe 
? United Kingdom  
? Belgium 
? Italy ( In 2006 & 2007, it is the most targeted country by 
stowaways) 
? France, Spain , the Netherlands and Greece 
• The United States and Canada 
 
 It is important to bear in mind that all findings related to the incidents linked 
to stowaways 121  and the interface of that phenomenon with unsafe practices 
associated with rescuing and transporting of distressed persons at sea122 , will be 
included in the analysis and how proper framing of policies should address these 
issues 123  will be considered. Different types of stowaway are found at sea and 
present a threat to port facilities and ships. These include refugees, economic 
                                                 
121 See UK P&I Club, “Theft incidents and the presence of stowaways in the port of Algiers (Algeria)”, 
Bulletin 444, (December, 2005). 
122 See UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2005, Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions, Geneva: 
UNHCR, April 2007 at p.9 and p. 13.  
123 See Selected Reference Materials; “Rescue at Sea, Maritime Interception and Stowaways”, Geneva: 
UNHCR, November 2006, at pp.197-209.The mass exodus of Maghreb’s boat people generated various 
concern. Also, questions of international criminal law arise where the rescue operation or assistance is 
necessitated as a consequence of smuggling operations. Past practice and current challenges highlight the 
need of agreements of coastal States to allow disembarkation of stowaways, asylum-seekers or refugees, 
and to provide temporary refuge for them until adequate solutions are settled down. The following factors 
must be considered: the impacts on smuggling and irregular movements, interception practices, 
resettlement policy and the challenge of dealing with cases found not to be in need of international 
protection, etc. 
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 migrants, illegal migrants, asylum seekers, and criminals. In the worst case scenario, 
terrorists may try to access vessels in order to use them as vectors in an attack against 
a specified target. By the same token, it is important to look deeply into the root 
causes, which are generally related to economic, social and political factors, such as 
the escape from civil unrest, religious and cultural persecution or unemployment. 
Undocumented persons raise the complex issues of personal classification and the 
appropriate internationally accepted mechanism in processing and handling these 
cases.  
 
 The main places where stowaways hide themselves on board commercial 
vessels depend on the type and size of the ships targeted124, and the time spent 
alongside or at anchor. Ro-Ro cargo ships are the ones that are singled out the most, 
followed by ferries, containerships and general cargo ships. Vessels that are 
characterized by short voyages, short transit time and high speeds are the usual 
targets of stowaways in the region, due to the fact that strategic information relevant 
to the vessels movement are easily obtained by them. This highlights the complex 
issues on vulnerabilities and risks generated by this menace. In the Maghreb, the 
stowaway crisis is real; national flagged ships or foreign vessels trading in the region 
are equally targeted without distinction as revealed by statistics published by IMO. 
Stowaways are still getting on board ships despite various prevention measures125 
taken by shipowners and their crews. Some turn up dead, drowned, killed or are 
injured by irresponsible masters126 in their attempts to solve the problem summarily 
                                                 
124 Easy access, shortage of crew, few guards or reduced watch on board a ship, aim to facilitate the tasks 
for potential stowaways. In getting correct information about the target, candidates to this risky adventure 
deduct easily the weak points or vulnerabilities, which encourage them to decide for an attempt or an 
offensive without regrets on their unlawful acts. Thus, they often forget that being a stowaway is 
considered as a crime and consequently punishable in accordance with the domestic laws prevailing in this 
zone. Also, stowaways often compromise the safety and security of the threatened ship and pose a danger to 
the whole adventure or maritime expedition, resulting in incalculable risks and potential consequences to 
him or her self, the crew, passengers, ship, cargo and environment.   
125 See ISPS Code Part A, Section 7 and 14 on security measures to be adopted by ships and port facilities. 
126 See the Maersk Dubai Case (1996). Three Romanian stowaways were thrown overboard in the high seas 
of the North Atlantic. The Captain called them “the fish”, and sent a message in which he made the 
following statement “I caught the fish”. This case highlights the real drama faced by ships and crews.  
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 in violation of international law on fundamental human rights127. These places where 
stowaways hide themselves include containers, cofferdams, rudder trunks, engine 
rooms, lifeboats, chain lockers, funnels, pipes, ventilation tunnels, cranes, trucks, 
stores or other lockers on board ships while such vessels are in port or waiting in an 
anchorage zone. In some instances, crew cabins are involved inadvertently furnishing 
a basis for criminalization of seafarers 128  as accomplices to the crime. Hence, 
reaffirming the notion generally accepted by the maritime community that on board 
the ship there is no safe space or clean place, regarding these threats129. 
3.1.2 Analysis of different types of stowaway and their motivation 
 
From the Maghreb towards Europe, several categories of stowaways130 are 
identified with respect to transportation by sea.  
3.1.2.1 Fortune seekers or economic migrants 
 
              In the Maghreb region, they are the most common group and are motivated 
mainly by the prospect of acquiring better job opportunities and improving their 
standard of living. This category is very vulnerable and is often targeted by 
organized crime or criminal gangs, seeking to infiltrate them and use them for 
criminal activities. This category falls under the Convention on Facilitation of 
International Maritime Traffic (FAL Convention), 1965 as amended. The definition 
                                                 
127 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which is the first international statement to use 
the term “human rights”, and has been adopted by the Human Rights movement as a Charter, where in its 
article 3 it is stipulated that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person”. 
128 See Dimitri Ladischensky, “Adored, reviled, abused, loved by romantics, feared by shipowners, killed 
by captains: stowaways –the myth and the reality”, Mare, No.60, February / March 2007, 
< http://www.mare.de/mare/english/pdf/mare60/mare60_blindpass1.pdf >, (June, 2007) at pp.1-5. An 
Algerian stowaway Choipai Ahmed was arrested on board The Hannover Express by Captain Köhns and 
given later on asylum in a European country. This “Blinde passagier” caused fear and torment on board.  
129 See Case Study S 006 on stowaways, Signal experiences, No space is safe, North of England P & I 
Association limited, 2006, at pp.1-2. < www.nepia.com>, (June, 2007). 
130 See The North of England P & I Association, “Types of stowaway”, Signals Special, No.6, March 6, 
2001 at pp. 1-12. < www.nepia.com >, (June, 2007). A clear categorization of stowaways was given and a 
detailed report on fines country by country, hot spot areas, preventive and remedial measures. Particular 
attention was given to the African perspective and Maghreb and to Spain regarding the irregular flow of 
illegal migrants by sea who drowned. The main procedures to be used as guidelines related to stowaway 
cases threatening ships were explained. 
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 of ship or vessel is found in the respective IMO conventions131. The FAL Convention 
gives the definition only of Cruise Ship in its Annex, Section 1.A. Furthermore, it is 
critical to make a distinction between the definition of alien who entered the country 
legally, but whose residential status or visa has expired, and the illegal immigrant 
who has entered the foreign territory in a clandestine way and often is undocumented. 
These two offences are considered as crimes132. The offences and punishments are 
different due to the difference in gravity between the two acts. Captains on board 
vessels trading in the Maghreb zone should be aware of these threats.    
3.1.2.2       Refugees  
 The definition of a refugee is contained in the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees, which define a refugee as an individual who: “owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country.”133 Refugees are protected and their particular status confers those rights, 
roles and responsibilities according to the prevailing international instruments. Some 
refugees are in some cases stowaways. This category of stowaway seeks to escape 
war, persecution, civil unrest and is indicated in many reports134. This exposes the 
                                                 
131 IMO Conventions are those instruments, such as MARPOL 73/78, SOLAS 74 as amended etc. 
132  See Brigadier B.A.H. Paritt, Stowaways by Sea, Illegal Immigrants, Refugees, Asylum Seekers, a 
Nautical Institute practical guide to a growing international problem, London: Nautical Institute, 1992 at 
p.44. See also refugees in Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 
133 The term refugee, like the people it covers may involve a lot of ground and it is often interpreted from 
different angles when it comes to the scope of application, regarding rights, roles and responsibilities 
related to its legal definition. Such divergent views may create new and complex debate for legislators or 
policy makers on how to tackle this issue related to the notion of refugee. This term does not apply to 
stateless people, internally displaced persons (IDPs), forced migrants, economic migrants and rejected 
asylum seekers as example, highlighting the necessity to frame new detailed legal definitions with regard to 
this sensitive issue. Also, mass exodus or mass flight of threatened population seeking to get on board 
vessels to cross the Mediterranean Sea is an important point, which should be considered by the Maghreb 
legislators or policy makers to tackle this international policy issue. See Cartagena Declaration and OAU 
for different definitions related to the notion of refugee. 
134 See Abdel Hakim Tizegha Case, an Algerian stowaway who entered fraudulently Boston on an Algerian 
LNG Tanker and was granted asylum after a series of trials, even though,  he was involved indirectly in the 
foiled millennium bombing plot as an associate of Ahmed Ressam. See, Janice L. Kephart, “Immigration 
and Terrorism: Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorism Travel, Connections”, The Quarterly 
Journal, Vol.5, No.2, Fall 2006, at p.56. 
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 related issue of fraud, undocumented persons and falsified papers etc.135 In addition; 
psychological disorders, aggressiveness and impulsiveness are observed in the 
mentioned group136. In general, they move in pairs or groups. North African States 
are very vulnerable in connection with this issue due to their porous borders and long 
frontiers which need protection and impose huge costs on the affected governments. 
3.1.2.3       Asylum seekers 
 
 Asylum seekers are called political refugees137 by some scholars, because 
they are linked to the social political factors prevailing in the country of origin and 
this category in the Maghreb region present a real risk to commercial ships trading in 
particular ports in the affected countries, specially, where internally displaced 
persons or illegal immigrants from the sub-Sahara are present in a huge number. 
These asylum seekers are refugees seeking asylum in Europe. In many cases, 
economic migrants claimed asylum to avoid expulsion, detention or repatriation. 
This category is often tempted to acquire false identification and sometimes pose as 
refugees from war torn or conflict areas. They usually demonstrate violent tendencies 
if they are not granted asylum readily. Masters trading in the Mediterranean Sea 
should be aware of this category of stowaways138. However, an asylum seeker who 
does meet the requirements of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees is granted the 
status of refugee and protected under its Articles 31 and 33, against expulsion, 
                                                 
135 See “Organized illegal Immigration into the European Union”, EUROPOL Report, (The Hague: Europol, 
January 2007) at pp.1-4, and Trafficking of Human Beings in the European Union, Europol Report,  
(The Hague: Europol, May 2007) at pp.1-6, describing all features related to this menace. 
< http://www.europol.europa.eu  >, (June 2007). 
136 Supra, footnote 128 at p.35; see p.1, the author stipulated that these types of stowaways tend to be 
impulsive. 
137 Supra, footnote 132 at p.36; see p.46-47, the author highlighted the problem of this type of stowaways, 
while on board commercial vessels; they try to get granted asylum in Europe. The Maghreb region is stated 
as a high risk area regarding the considered menace related to this category. 
138 See Article 4, Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, fixing the conditions on granting a 
nationality to a person not born in a Contracting State. Article 1, Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons, 1954, defines the term stateless person as “a person who is not considered as a national 
by any State under the operation of its law”. Also, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 
shall be considered and its Protocol of 1967, fixes the conditions and definitions on refugees and gives the 
different technical modalities related to the use of this international instrument. The Declaration on the 
Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, 1985, defines the 
term alien  and it applies “to any individual who is not a national of the State in which he or she is present, 
with due regard to qualifications made in subsequent articles in this convention”. 
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 repatriation and penalties or other punishments in force regarding these offences.   
Favorable treatments are given to refugees or asylum seekers by international 
instruments, whereas in some jurisdictions immigration law139 is more restrictive and 
does not give such rights to the offender who is classed as an illegal immigrant. 
Therefore, Captains must act responsibly with respect to safety and health related 
matters when they encounter such category of stowaways, especially women and 
children who are entitled to better protection under international law.140
 
3.1.2.4       Criminals or terrorists 
  
 This category of stowaways is the most worrisome and represents a huge 
concern to the shipping industry and stakeholders. Criminals linked to the organized 
crime or transnational organized crime or escaping sanctions/punishments after trials 
in a particular jurisdiction, absconders, deserters etc, fall all under this group of 
stowaways. They are considered by experts as aggressive, violent and generally 
uncooperative with the ship’s staff or authorities when found or discovered on board 
a vessel while at sea, at anchor or berthed141. This category of stowaways is seldom 
restricted to individuals, but includes gangs or groups seeking to gain access on 
board commercial ships, such as ferries or containerships through the weak links 
existing in the maritime security chain. These criminals operate in accordance with 
criminal theories or existing networks as described by enforcement agencies, such as 
Interpol or Europol. The involvement of organized crime has been often documented 
and published in annual reports by official agencies or organizations working in this 
field. 
                                                 
139 See the Tampa case, 2001 in Vadarlis v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Others 
(Federal Court of Australia, V 900 of 2001). 460 Asylum seekers were held on board the vessel. 
140 A particular attention shall be made by the Captains regarding the issues related to asylum seekers, 
refugees and stateless people and they shall take into account all international instruments related to the 
subject, such as UN Conventions, guidelines issued by UNHCR, European Asylum Convention and the 
Schengen Accords or any other general practices and customs recognized by treaty law. 
141 Supra, footnote 130 at p.35; see p.1, it is mentioned that this type of stowaways may be linked or related 
to other illicit activities, such as contraband, narcotics trafficking or smuggling of prohibited items, etc. 
these stowaways considered as criminals under international criminal law may present a serious threat to 
the ship, crew and environment, menacing the whole trade in extreme cases. Particular destinations are 
prevalent for such offences falling under penal law and are punished in conformity with the prevailing 
domestic law of the country where the offence occurred.  
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  As long as the impacts of growing globalisation are not adequately addressed 
by policy makers in resolving all dimensions of the problem, these risks will persist. 
Hence, organized crime syndicates or transnational organized networks which are 
motivated to exploit the situation through infiltration and other means would want to 
get the most out of this lucrative market. Consequently, the use of organized crime 
mega networks to facilitate the illegal migration trade appears to be increasing, in 
view of their professionalism and organizational skills in managing groups. They are 
profit-driven and have well established routes from the Maghreb region towards the 
South European borders.142 North Africa is considered as a transit point to enter the 
European Union (E.U). All types of vessels are targeted by these criminals and they 
often use detours which lengthens both the voyage and the route and fraught with 
more risks due to new enforcement regimes adopted by the E.U. In view of the latest 
Europol reports, captains, public authorities and policy makers should consider this 
category of stowaways, and take appropriate steps143 in implementing the requisite 
preventive and remedial measures. All offences committed by these criminals fall 
under international criminal law144 and domestic law. In consequence, problems of 
detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of maritime crimes are raised145, 
and the Maghreb States are directly impacted due to their geographic location as all 
trafficking or smuggling routes of illegal migrants pass through the Maghreb 
countries, creating huge burden on legislators and policy makers to come up with 
answers to these threats. 
                                                 
142 Smuggling routes are principally from Morocco to Spain, whereas Algeria as a transit country offers 
multiple choices to the criminal networks due to the immensity of its territory.  
143 The modus operandi related to the routes used and contributor factors are prima facie elements for 
investigators.  
144 See Robert Cryer and Håkan Friman and Darryl Robinson and Elisabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at p.349 and 
p.382. Detailed procedures of international criminal investigations and prosecutions are provided and 
evidentiary rules described.  
145 The main problems are related to the detection of stowaways at the port facilities or adjacent waterfronts, 
revealing the lack of equipments to detect these threats, lack of information exchange between the different 
agencies involved, etc. Problems of investigation and prosecution of maritime crimes , meanly regarding 
the stowaway menace due to lack of trust of victims, lack of evidence, real or oral testimony, lack of 
technical knowledge on how to use international cooperation tools such as formal or informal mutual legal 
assistance, lack of systematic criminal procedures for taking testimony expeditiously, problems with the 
punishment of the maritime crime and corruption, ineffective countermeasures against the enumerated 
maritime crimes etc. 
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  These criminals also represent a huge menace the ship, crew, cargo and 
environment, involving various scenarios. 146 The last suicide bombings which 
happened in the Maghreb highlight the nature and form of the existing threat147. The 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, 1988 also has relevance in this matter 148 . This convention obliges 
Contracting Governments either to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. All 
Maghreb States have ratified this Convention and its Protocol. However, the 2005 
SUA Convention and its Protocol is not in force and will probably take years before 
entering into force, because many grey areas still persist, such as the definitions on 
maritime terrorism and maritime crime. 
  
• Push and Pull Factors:  
 
 What are the main motivation which drives stowaways or migrants to move 
from the Maghreb towards Europe and targeting all types and means of 
transportation by sea?149 From the perspective of the Maghreb region, the following 
push and pull factors are observed150: 
 
a. The causes and consequences of migration and stowaways flows are 
social, economic, political and environmental. 
                                                 
146 See ISPS Code, Part B, Section 8.9 Section 15.11   for the detailed possible threats to ships and port 
facilities, such as “damage to, or destruction of the ship or of a port facility, hijacking or seizure of the ship 
or of persons on board, tampering with cargo, unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways, 
smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction, use of the ship to carry those 
intending to cause a security incident and /or their equipment, the use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a 
mean to cause damage or destruction, attacks from seaward whilst at berth or at anchor , etc.”. 
147 See Hassane Meftahi, “Suicide Bombing Kills 10 in Algeria” , The Guardian, July 11, 2007,  
< http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6772444,00.html >, (July, 2007).   
148 See SUA 88 which stipulates “that its main purpose is to ensure that appropriate action is taken against 
persons committing unlawful acts against ships, including the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence 
against persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to damage or 
destroy it”. < http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686 >, (July, 2007). 
149 See Ernest George Ravenstein’s laws of migration. He was a geographer of German extraction who 
worked at the Royal Geographical Society in London.  In 1885, he published a paper entitled “The Laws of 
Migration” in the Journal of the Statistical Society. “Any migration is as a result of push forces at the origin 
and pull forces at the destination” (Push Pull Theory). < http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~tobler/publications 
/pdf_docs/movement/migration/Ravenstein.pdf >, (June, 2007). 
150 Supra, footnote 135 at p.37; see pp.1-4, giving the reasons that migrants leave their home countries 
continues to exist and is worsening. The report described the push and pull factors for the Maghreb region. 
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 b. Push factors:  Dissolution and disintegration of multicultural States, social 
disequilibrium,  religious and ethnic conflicts, natural disasters , such as 
earthquakes, shortage of water, global warning and climate change, 
discrimination against minority groups, political instability, 
unemployment, terrorism activities, economic situation, uncontrollable 
population growth and illegal migrants issues, impoverishments, poor 
government policies. 
 
c. Pull Factors: Shortage of manpower and unsaturated labor market, 
economic prosperity, employment opportunity, family reunion-Diaspora, 
better health care and life expectancy, comprehensive social security, 
democratic systems of government, political and social stability, historical 
links, common languages and existing communities in the sending 
countries as well as in the receiving States, expectations, human rights, 
propaganda and ex- colonial ties, climate and attractive regions.151 
 
 These types of stowaway are targeting ships and port facilities in the 
Maghreb region because of the following reasons: 
 
• Easy access to port facilities and ships, complicity and corruption in the 
arena 
• Fast speed ships, such as ferries and Ro-Ro cargo ships. 
• Availability and easy access to information  
• Old port configuration surrounded by human habitation – proximity of 
cities and suburbs 
• Low costs and less risks involved 
• Lack of adequate security equipments to detect and deter these threats 
                                                 
151 These comments on push and pull factors have been inspired in analyzing newspapers from the Maghreb 
and by using MLAW 301, lecture handouts on “Maritime Crime & Maritime Criminal Law, Advanced 
Issues in Public and Private Maritime Law” of Assistant Professor Maximo Q. Mejia, WMU, (March 8, 
2007). Illegal migration by sea, stowaways and human trafficking /smuggling, threats, types of stowaways 
and push/pull factors were analyzed and described regarding worldwide trends. 
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 • Poor enforcement agencies and lack of effective implementation of 
international instruments into national legislation   
• Lack of effective preventive and remedial measures, inadequate sanctions 
or punishments by the repressive legal system , fines and penalties are 
insufficient in many cases to discourage the offenders 
• Poor enforcement regarding the punishment of offenders, overcrowded 
prisons, social costs; stowaways are seldom jailed and often get free after 
trials, escape prosecution, etc. 
• Organized crime or transnational organized crime networks, local gangs 
• Insufficient patrols at sea, in and around port facilities. 
• Other reasons. 
3.1.3 The consequences of having stowaways on board ships  
 
  Stowaways on board can cause inter-personal problems, legal issues, 
financial claims and problems for shipowners as well as State authorities when the 
vessel is calling in their ports. Additionally, various costs come into the picture, such 
as those related to delays, detention152, maintenance and repatriation.153 IMO again 
gets tough on stowaways, because this crisis and dilemma still persist and is not 
going away as rapidly as it should. Carriers continue to bear the burden of fines and 
other penalties and even severe punishments have not resolved the issue. The main 
trends in certain regions are increasing and getting worse154.  Many countries impose 
fines under their domestic legislation for having stowaways on board the vessel at its 
arrival and in case they escape from it155. This issue highlights the impacts on the 
shipping sector, regarding financial and social costs supported by the shipowners or 
                                                 
152 See the German M/V Cap Anamur Case (2004). In July 2004, the crew of the vessel rescued 37 African 
asylum seekers from their unseaworthy boat in the Mediterranean Sea and took them aboard. On 12 July 
2004, the vessel was allowed to call in Italy. The master and crew were arrested and the ship was seized. 
153 See ITF, guidelines, policy on stowaways and their treatment on board. < www.itf.org.uk >, (July, 2007).  
154 See “Perplexity of the refugee crisis throws masters into deep end”, Lloyd’s List, July 9, 2007,  
< www.lloydslist.com/art/1183553721373 >, (June 30, 2007). “A master who kept the stowaways battened 
down below because he feared for the safety of his ship if they escaped was accused of being cavalier with their 
human rights”. 20 stowaways were found and his crew was only 15 on that containership. 
155 Spain imposes a fine equivalent to 160,000 US Dollars if a stowaway escapes while the ship is in its 
territory. In other countries, the fines vary from 1,000 to 10,000 US Dollars according to the case. 
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 by the public sector156. Preventive measures are essential for stowaways’ threats in 
the port as well as on the ship. Therefore, ships’ crew and ship operators have to 
exercise due diligence regarding this menace. IMO guidelines157 are helpful devices 
to prevent and ease the resolution of conflicting cases. 
 
 The adoption of effective, fair and equitable measures are a huge challenge 
for legislators in respect of enforcement regimes and the prosecution of the offenders, 
because they may be in conflict with international treaties which protect the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers. Prosecution, detention, expulsion, repatriation or 
deportation158 must be done separately and in a transparent manner, i.e.;   in bona 
fide tradition. However, the distinction between individuals or groups considered as 
stowaways, attempted stowaways and other categories is very delicate for the 
authorities and policy makers, in drafting effective and efficient policies to eliminate 
these threats. The potential consequences related to this menace are a multi-faceted 
problem, whereby risks and vulnerabilities are revealed, exposing the grey areas 
related to enforcement regimes. Given the above, there are huge legal and 
jurisdictional implications arising from the phenomenon of stowaways or illegal 
migrants by sea.  
 
 The reader will next be introduced to the legal definitions related to the key 
words and terms associated with this study. Furthermore, a critical analysis of the 
relevant conventions will also be submitted.  
                                                 
156 Supra, footnote 151 at p.41, “ …once the stowaways are landed, additional costs are coming into the 
arena , such as health and welfare costs , administrative procedures, etc…”, whereas, “expenses on board 
the ship for repatriation, fines, delays, cleaning and bedding etc…, fall on the shipowner’s side”. See also 
the risks covered by P& I Clubs, such as those stipulated in rule 19(5) and (6) of North England P&I Club, 
< www.nepia.com >, (June, 2007). These rules give an overview of claims which may be covered by the 
Club if the shipowner can prove that all steps have been taken to avoid stowaways boarding the ship. Only 
diversion expenses imply specific conditions prior consideration of the claim by the insurers. 
157  See IMO Guidelines on the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful Resolution of 
Stowaway cases, Res.A.871 (20), adopted on 27 November 1997, defining clearly the procedures to be 
adopted by masters, shipowners, port authorities, national administrations, and other related bodies to 
cooperate to prevent illegal access to a vessel while it is in port, and those related to countries of transit. 
158  See Gilles de Kerchove and Anne Weyembergh, (eds.), Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in the 
Penal Field within the European Union, (Brussels: Université Libre de Brussels, January, 2001). The 
authors highlighted the need to harmonize and unify the penal procedures in the European Union (E.U) and 
also emphasized on the need of a mutual recognition regarding the judicial decisions related to the threats 
described in this chapter. 
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 3.1.4 The notion of stowaways and different national legal regimes 
  The first attempt to tackle the issue was done by CMI with the 
International Convention relating to stowaways in 1957, giving the first definition of 
stowaway159, measures to be taken when discovered on board and the procedures for 
disembarkation, and costs for repatriation supported by the shipowner. States did not 
adhere to it and became later a death born convention, and never entered into force. 
IMO’s response to the threat was the FAL Convention, 1965 as amended 160 , 
introducing clear definitions on attempted stowaway, “A person who is secreted on a 
ship, or in cargo…., and who is detected on board before it has departed from the 
port”, whereas stowaway means “…., detected on board after it has departed from a 
port or in the cargo while unloading it in the port of arrival, and is reported as a 
stowaway by the Master to the appropriate authorities”. The penal provisions 
regarding this kind of offence vary from one State to another. As for example, in the 
USA161, “…..shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or 
both”, whereas in the UK162 a fine based on a standard scale is used to determine the 
sanction. In contrast, in Algeria the Algerian Maritime Code (AMC) in its Article 
545 stipulates “that any person who stow away is found on board a ship with intent 
of using the ship for crossing abroad is punished six (06) months to five (05) years 
imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 Algerian Dinards to 50,000 Algerian Dinards. The 
same sanctions apply for seafarers if convicted of complicity…” A disparity in the 
regimes worldwide is observed, varying from one country to another, regarding fines 
under their domestic law, proving that their enforcement mechanisms are not 
harmonized. There is a dire need for new procedures and clear definitions regarding 
                                                 
159 See International Convention Relating to Stowaways, 1957 art.1, “ stowaway means a person who, at 
any port or place in the vicinity thereof, secretes himself in a ship without the consent of  the shipowner or 
the Master ….and who is on board after the ship has left that port or place”. 
160 The International Convention on Facilitation of International Traffic, 1965 was amended in 2002 and 
2005, introducing clear definitions on attempted stowaway and stowaway in Annex section 1,  A, fixing 
standards and recommended practices for all related issues on stowaways. 
161 See US Code , title 18, crimes and criminal procedures part I, ch.107,  S.2199, seamen and stowaways, 
such crimes are fined not more than $1,000 ,< http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/>, (April 29,2007). 
162 Under UK Merchant Shipping Act 1995, C.21, S.103 related to stowaways, it is considered as an offence, 
“…shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale”, also under 
S.104, unauthorized presence on board ship,“….shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not 
exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”. 
< http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1995 /Ukpga_19950021_en_5.htm#mdiv103 >, (April 29, 2007). 
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 the notion of “maritime crime” and “maritime offence”. Additionally, all existing 
conventions do not provide legal definitions on terrorism and maritime terrorism acts. 
These gaps generate grey areas which are barriers to harmonization and uniformity 
of procedures and effective interpretation. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The Stowaway Continuum 163
 
 
            As illustrated in Figure 8, the spectrum and continuum vary 
from less violent maritime criminal acts to high violent maritime criminal acts 
according to the case, increasing the risks and potential consequences. Different steps 
are involved in this continuum and various conventions come into light as the 
incident falls in one of the three categorized scenarios. The preventive measures are 
the most important factors in maritime security to ensure an efficient and effective 
system and if they fail, remedial measures or mitigation will reduce the consequences 
due to the incident164.  
 The legal regimes vary from one State to another and national standards 
adopted through legislation are the basis for defining the sanctions, such as fines and 
                                                 
163 This figure has been inspired by MLAW 301, lecture handouts on “Penal Law, Advanced Issues in 
Public and Private Maritime Law” of Professor Proshanto K. Mukherjee, WMU, (March, 2007). 
Depending on the considered criminal act which may vary from less to highly violent maritime act. 
164 See Professor P.K. Mukherjee and Max Mejia Jr., “The SUA Convention 2005: a critical evaluation of 
its effectiveness in suppressing maritime criminal acts”, The Journal of International Maritime Law, Vol.12, 
No.3, May-June 2006, at p.171 and p.176-179. A critical review of SUA convention has been done. 
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 penalties to be considered regarding prosecution of stowaways, attempted stowaways 
and persons helping them in gaining access to ships. The consequences are various 
and their impacts on the ship, crew, cargo and the environment are important in case 
of terrorism. Criminalization of the offenders if they are crew members is another 
issue to consider, depending on the breaches of the code of conduct or disciplinary 
code according to the jurisdiction involved. Stowaways as asylum seekers must be 
treated in compliance with international protection principles set out in relevant 
treaties165 .Regarding the issues on stowaways; international legal regimes do not 
tackle the problem in its totality, so inadequacy and grey areas persist, mainly 
regarding the treatment of seafarers. The 2005 Protocol of the SUA Convention 166 
has introduced an approach to the problem by tackling the issue on human dignity 
and rights of crew members on board a ship, but nothing on the legal enforcement 
regime and harmonization of procedures.  
 
 The case Romania v. Chang167 traumatized the whole maritime community 
in 1996, when three stowaways were thrown overboard. On the one hand a 
proliferation of international instruments strengthens the burden on ships; but on the 
other hand there are increased costs, delays, and risk of searches, seizure, and other 
prosecutions. The master alone takes all responsibilities on his shoulder and faces 
pressures from the external world. He has to decide on what is an unlawful act, 
contrary to the maritime traditions. Fatality or lack of enforcement regimes, are both 
involved in the tragic events regarding stowaways dying silently without any 
assistance. The threats will exist and only a common decision at international level 
                                                 
165 See the 1951 Refugee Convention, UNHCR and its Protocol 67, relating to the status of refugees, 
defines exactly the term refugee. Art.1 A (1), International Organization for Migration (IOM) resolutions 
must be taken into account. < http://www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp>, (April 8, 2007). 
166 See article 8 bis of 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention 88, setting some procedures to be followed for 
ensuring that all person on board are treated in conformity with the applicable  provisions of international 
law on human dignity and rights.  
167  1997 Carswell  NS 127(sub nom. Romania (State) v. Cheng), 114 C.C.C. (3d) 289, (sub nom. 
Roumania v. Cheng) 158 N.S.R. (2d) 13, (sub nom. Roumania v. Cheng) 466 A.P.R. 13, [1997] N.S.J. No. 
106, a Taiwan-flagged container ship has thrown 3 Romanian stowaways overboard in the icy high seas of 
the Atlantic, murder suspects were released and the Canadian court rejected Romanian request for 
extradition, only the flag State could investigate and the appropriate actions. 
<http://international.westlaw.com/search /default.wl?spa=intmaritime-000&rs=WLIN7.02&fn=_top&sv 
=Split&db=CAN-ALLCASES&vr=2.0&rp =%2fsearch%2fdefault.wl&mt=WestlawInternational >,  
(April 18, 2007). 
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 on the issue, based on an effective and proactive approach could resolve the problem 
in the long term.   
 The shipmaster has a legal and moral obligation to render assistance to 
persons in distress at sea 168  without regard to their nationality, status or the 
circumstances in which they are found. This longstanding maritime tradition is an 
obligation enshrined in international law169. 
  
3.2 Transportation of contraband goods and drugs by sea 
 
 The notion of “contraband” has not be clearly be defined by the international 
instruments, but in its broad sense it means “an act of smuggling of a property that is 
unlawfully produced, possessed, or transported”170. Even some existing overlapping 
areas are found; trafficking differs from smuggling171. Acts of contraband concern 
mainly fraudulent payments, fraudulent loading or unloading carried out either inside 
the port or along the coast, acts of the removal or substitution during transportation 
of goods, all acts of customs fraud, violations of legislative or regulatory provisions 
and acts of importation or exportation without declaration.  
                                                 
168 See Rescue at Sea, a guide to principles and practice as applied to migrants and refugees, IMO/UNHCR. 
Also, UNCLOS 82 in its article 98(1) provides that “Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its 
flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render 
assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue 
of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected 
of him”, and Article 98(2). SOLAS 74, as amended in chapter V, Regulation 33(1), obliges the master of a 
ship to provide assistance to persons in distress after receiving the information and has the obligation to 
proceed with all speed to rescue them and to inform SAR services, chapter V, regulation 7 requires State 
Parties to ensure that distress communication and coordination are existent. The International Convention 
on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), 1979 obliges State Parties to “….ensure that assistance be provided 
to any person in distress at sea…..” (Chapter 2.1.10) and, to “provide medical assistance or other needs, 
deliver the rescued persons in a safe place.”(Chapter 1.2.3).  Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea are helpful tools to guide governments and captains of ships for implementing the new 
amendments as stipulated in MSC.167 (78). 
169 See,  Justin Stares and Bryan Reyes,  “Brussels issues warning of stranded migrants”,  Lloyd’s List,  May 
29,  2007. < http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/home/index.htm >, (May, 2007).  
170 Means goods prohibited by law or treaty from being imported or exported, smuggled goods. 
< http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/contraband.html >, (May 8, 2007).  
171 See UNDOC for the distinction between trafficking from smuggling. Therefore,  two Protocols are 
available, one on trafficking and one on smuggling, have been adopted in December 2000 to supplement 
the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, definitions in both Protocols, art.3(a).  Alien 
smuggling is the procurement of illegal entry by a person into a State assisted by a facilitator who has the 
objective of making a profit; trafficking involves an additional element of coercion or other forms of 
violence., < http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf >,  (May 18,  2007). 
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  It can be noted that the scope of concern is very large and may involve 
different enforcement authorities, such as customs, police and other agencies 
depending on the domestic law regime. The concept of contraband of goods under 
national legislation often includes provisions related to seizure and confiscation of 
goods that have been used in connection with a crime172. In many States, different 
enforcement regimes are adopted173.  
 
 In the Maghreb region, disparities regarding these offences and punishments 
stipulated in their Penal Codes are observed and the different official reports 
highlight the increase of narcotics’ use and smuggling cases.  Therefore, for the same 
crime or criminal offence, the sanctions, fines or penalties are not uniform 
worldwide 174 and particularly in this region. It is important to highlight that 
smuggling contraband by sea is a matter of customs administrations in various 
countries and evasion of duty or tariffs applicable and bypassing controls are the 
main motives. In the Maghreb States, the items most frequently smuggled are 
cigarettes, alcohol, spirits, electronic equipment, jewellery and various others, 
depending on the market. It is demand driven and changes rapidly with the 
globalisation and various factors175.  
  
 Different types of smuggling can be distinguished, such as goods smuggled 
as transported commodity, or amount of goods smuggled. It can be goods transported 
by an individual or in large scale using different means of transportation. Regarding 
                                                 
172 See US Code title 19, related to customs duties ch.4, III.V on enforcement provisions. 
 < http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title19/chapter4_subtitleiii_partv_.html> (April 8, 2007). 
173 See J.C. Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, 3rd edition, London: Butterworth 
& Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1986, at pp.110-120. The authors highlighted the issue of strict liability and drug 
offences. Fernandez Case [1970], U.K. Crim. LR 277, CA. A seaman was convicted of possessing cannabis 
when he was given a package to bring into England and he took it. He was caught and found guilty even he 
did not know that the package contained prohibited drugs. His mental state was an important factor 
considered by the judges. 
174 See Australian Custom Act 1901 < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1901124/>  
(April 20, 2007). See the sanctions, fines and penalties are differently perceived for smuggling cases as 
mentioned in comparison in the Maghreb penal codes. 
175 See Jagdish N.Bhagwati  and Bent Hansen, “A Theoretical Analyse of Smuggling”,  The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics,Vol.89,No.4 (Nov, 1975), at pp.651-657,  < http://www.jstor.org/cgi-
bin/jstor/printpage/00335533 /di951822/95p0093r/0.pdf?backcontext=page&dowhat= Acrobat&config= 
jstor&userID= c3b2f7a3@mah.se/01cc99331400501bc2633&0.pdf > , (April 8, 2007).  
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 the area of crimes and offences, smuggling activities are crimes of opportunity. As 
legal systems differ from one State to another, laws on taxation, customs and 
sanctions also do so. This region is becoming the transit passage176 for all smugglers 
and traffickers from or outside the continent, using new routes to convoy their 
prohibited items to Europe or other destination as published by Europol and WCO 
reports in 2007. These threats are mainly observed by land and sea routes, because 
the aviation industry has strengthened the security measures on planes and airports. 
 
 The Keck case177 has set the contours of most smuggling regulations in the 
U.S.A. Enforcement power is exercised by customs in most countries and may board 
any vessel, and examine the vessel and any merchandise or person carried on board. 
Vessels may be brought into a port and investigated for compliance with regulations 
as stipulated in the national legislation. Ships involved in smuggling could be 
confiscated, sold or destroyed in extreme cases. Law enforcement is one of the most 
important aspects of the controls regarding smuggling. The risks178 and potential 
consequences are that from normal contraband goods, drugs and arms could come 
into the picture and at the end of the spectrum, terrorist trying to smuggle nuclear 
devices, safety, security and the environment could be directly affected.   
  
 Thus, a continuum for contraband of goods and drugs is needed to understand 
the relationship between the risks, incidents/threats and the preventive measures on a 
defined scale. As illustrated in Figure 9 below, from minor to a catastrophic scenario, 
risks are higher. 
                                                 
176 John Zarocastas, “Drug smugglers target countries in three continents for transshipment”, Lloyd’s List, 
March 8, 2007. Cocaine and new drugs are transshipped through the African continent by the smugglers. 
177 Keck v. U S, 172 U.S. 434 (1899), a passenger on a ship attempted to bring diamonds into an US port 
and was caught during the search aboard that ship by the customs, the Court decided that person was not 
guilty and did not smuggle , because she had the opportunity to claim them after she would disembark from 
the ship.< http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=172&invol=434> ( April 9, 2007). 
 See B.A.H. Paritt, Illegal Drugs by Sea, London: The Nautical Institute, 1998 at p.7 and p.24.  It is also 
suggested to use International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse: Guidelines 
for Owners and Masters on Recognition and Detection, London: Secretary General, ICS, (August 1988). 
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Figure 9: The continuum for contraband of goods and drugs 179
 
  
 The Santorini case on weapons smuggling in 2003 and Karine A case180are 
the most related examples regarding this issue. By analyzing the spectrum, different 
international instruments described in the beginning of this paper come into the 
pictures for high violent criminal acts and maritime zones issues. For nuclear devices, 
SUA 88 and its Protocols181 and other UN treaties apply. The ISPS Code does not 
provide a law enforcement provision for States; it is left to national legislation. 
Criminal legislation deals with misdeclaration to customs and contraband issues, 
because it is a crime according to the treaties and it falls under the Penal regime, as 
criminal offence. The main grey areas are the complexity of procedures which 
hamper the free trade facilitation as stipulated by GATT/WTO, UNCITRAL182 . The 
proactive approach is the solution.  
                                                 
179 Supra, see footnote 163 at p.45. The author highlights the usefulness of the continuum for crimes. 
180 The Karin A was a 4,000 ton freighter intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces on 3 January 2002 while 
it carried a wide variety of weapons. While the ship itself was worth an estimated $400,000 and the civilian 
cargo used to conceal the weapons approximately $3,000,000 
< http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/katyusha.htm>, (May 8, 2007). 
181SUA 88 means the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, 1988 and the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention, Article 3 stipulates , “… and the placing 
of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it”. 
182 UNCITRAL has published documents on commercial fraud where smuggling was considered as a threat 
and new procedures were implemented in the shipping industry. 
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  The complexity of procedures under customs provisions must be simplified. 
Regarding policy issues, overlapping conventions dealing with the same subject exist 
and new approaches must be implemented, such as enforcement strategies, 
international co-operation and communication with the organizations involved, 
effective networks, regional cooperation, audits, and a review of operational 
procedures by strengthening the sanctions if breaches are detected. As societies move 
forward, trade is increasing, and the container security will be the main concern as 
more mega container ships are built. A priority for the effective implementation of 
measures is necessary. The transport chain risk and multi modal issues will increase, 
due to new threats, technology, new markets, creating a need for developing 
countries to overcome the gaps and lack of uniformity. Exchange of information 
based on intelligence and studies done on database research on crimes should be 
done.   
 
 A review of law enforcement procedure is necessary. For container issues, 
models based on Container Security initiative and C-TPAT 183  may be used to 
reinforce the national legislation and strengthen the countermeasures in case of 
incidents. Drug smuggling by sea is a phenomenon of the illegal drug trade based on 
the thinking that those who take the least risk earn the most money, while those who 
take the most risk, earn the least regarding seamen involved in numerous cases. 
Official reports highlight these trends in the Maghreb region, particularly in Morocco, 
Algeria184 and Tunisia. The type of drug smuggled in this area is essentially the kif, 
but cocaine and other illicit drugs have entered the arena recently and are threatening 
                                                 
183 Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT): to secure the Supply Chain, and control 
effectiveness. 
184 The recent case related to the Algerian M/V El Djorf belonging to the shipping company CNAN Group 
was arrested in the port of Antwerp in Belgium for possession on board of an important quantity of kif, 12 
stowaways on board and contraband of cigarettes was brought the public attention. The ship was detained 
as result of an administrative procedure and the penalties for its release were fixed to 100,000 Euros. The 
vessel was sailing to Turkey, but during the voyage it received an order to deviate to Antwerp. The 
Algerian authorities at the arrival of the ship in Algiers immediately prosecuted and jailed the master and 
some managers involved from the shipping company according to the national newspaper El Watan, May 2, 
2005. < http://www.elwatan.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=18413 >, (June, 2007). 
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 the whole shipping trade. Ships and other means of transportation by sea are the most 
targeted in view of the latest incidents185. 
 
 Law enforcement may become obsolete as globalisation is increasing, and 
risk management could be a solution for detecting the new threats. Data exchange on 
crimes, organized crime and transnational organized crime can draw the real picture 
of the situation as long as security assessment is done   on accurate information about 
threats and implementation processes. The harmonizing of policies to ensure free 
movement of goods and diminishing the risks are important objectives to realise. 
Tracking product seizure, counterfeit goods policies have to be strengthened. 
Contraband of goods by crew on board a ship is a serious breach under the Penal 
Code and Shipping Legislation186. However, in fixing the sanctions by criminalizing 
seafarers, an important and complex debate for the maritime industry187 should be 
raised.  
 
 Some actions are needed in the arena of policy making to balance the threats 
by using high technology and IMO Guidelines, and other treaties related to 
contraband of goods by sea. A proactive approach is required for policy makers, 
based on gathering information, co-operation at all levels and commitment of all 
entities involved by instituting audits, and controlling effective implementation in 
order to harmonize the procedures, gathering new technologies and analyzing the 
costs.  The main benefit against this cancer threatening the modern society would be 
on the public side by ensuring effective policy making based on social, political and 
economical considerations. However, a review and separation of conventions related 
or linked directly to the same matters could be done, by eliminating ambiguity and 
overlapping issues.  
                                                 
185 Eoin O’Cinneide, “Drug ship seized off Spain, in the Alboran Sea between Spain and Morocco”, Trade 
Winds, (February 16, 2007). 
186  See U.K Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (C. 21) for crew offences. 
187 See Andree Kirchner, “Maritime security: consequences for maritime transport industry”, in Ocean 
Yearbook, Vol.19: maritime transport and security, pp.299-309, International Ocean Institute (IOI), 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
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  Transportation of contraband goods and stowaways share some similar 
ingredients regarding the evolution of events, and associated risks involving potential 
consequences according to the analysis of their continuum. A minor threat may 
become a catastrophic scenario or incident if the preventive measures fail. Both need 
efficient means to mitigate after deterrence and have the same sanctions if a maritime 
criminal act occurs. Therefore, new tools are needed for policy makers and 
legislators in the Maghreb, such as efficient and proactive solutions regarding 
enforcement regimes at all levels. Innovation, harmonization of procedures and 
cooperation are vital to ensure fairness and equity regarding penalties and fines 
applied in different jurisdictions. The Maghreb countries facing gaps in their 
enforcement capabilities and considering to have elaborated statutory provisions in 
their maritime legislation should enhance the standards used, by addressing the 
issues on stowaways, criminal offences, fines and penalties with regard to the public 
welfare and the shipping industry188.  
 
 Regulatory and penal provisions should be reinforced by assessing all 
probable threats faced by the ports, port facilities and ships by collaborating with all 
enforcement authorities and agencies involved in the sector. Regarding certain 
treaties and international instruments, overlapping issues and new needs may be 
considered in the short term to tackle all grey areas requiring improvements and 
harmonization based on regional agreements. Policy proposals may consist in an 
increased cooperation between all authorities to exchange data on smuggling and 
stowaways, for gathering information, on the different audits and risk management189. 
Security costs and cost benefit analysis must be done regularly. Enforcement of 
policy, implementation mechanisms, new countermeasures are needed in view of the 
latest data published by IMO190 and UN agencies regarding the issues related to 
                                                 
188 See Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maritime Legislation, Malmö: World Martime University, 2002 at p.186 
and p.195.  A detailed explanation on different steps to be undertaken in drafting legislation is given by the 
author. Also, different drafting processes anatomies of statutes, styles and forms are provided. 
189 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society-Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage Publications, 1992. The author 
emphasizes on the perception of risks by the society and the evolution of technology contributing to new 
threats and challenges.  
190See IMO report, “Rescue at sea, responding to migrants and asylum”, Seaways, October 2006. 
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 contraband, smuggling, trafficking and stowaways. The use of IMO guidelines191, 
UN reports and the maritime industry practices 192  could diminish the risks of 
occurrence by targeting the organized crime and on a basis of regional agreements an 
exchange of information between all authorities concerned and the building of an 
international network to facilitate the sea trade.  
 
 
 In conclusion, contraband of goods and drugs as well as stowaway issues 
could be tackled by resolving the missing legal and technical aspects by encouraging 
security expertise193 and building a culture based on awareness and challenges194. 
The Maghreb region considered as a bridge between Europe and the continent will 
continue to suffer from all these threats and only long term solutions may resolve 
partly some of them.  
 
 
 The reader will in the next chapter be exposed to policy issues related to State 
responsibility and government strategies on transportation of stowaways, drugs and 
contraband goods by sea from a Maghreb regional perspective. The debate also 
examines conflicting interests and assesses their impacts on policy making. 
 
                                                 
191 IMO guidelines assist in providing the standards to be adopted and give the recommended practices to 
fight against these threats. See, revised Guidelines on Illicit drug traffick, MSC/Circ.228 (82), December 
2006, MSC/Circ. 443, MSC/Circ.559, IMO-Res.A.867 (20), Res.A.871 (20) and A.872 (20), etc. 
192 See Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO), “The shipmaster’s security manual: preventive 
measures and remedies for drug smuggling, piracy and stowaways”, Copenhagen: BIMCO, 1998. 
193 See Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO), “Ship Security”, BIMCO Bulletin, Vol.101, No.6, 
December, 2006. The authors highlight the need of private security expertise from the shipping industry to 
enhance maritime security awareness related to ship security issues. 
194 See Paul Lightburn, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code): port security 
handbook, Surrey: Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay, 2004.The author emphasizes the importance of security 
awareness and security expertise to tackle all security issues related to ports and port facilities. 
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CHAPTER 4  
DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY IN THE MAGHREB REGION: 
NEW CHALLENGES OR DILEMMA? 
“The welfare of the people is the ultimate law (Salus Populi Suprema Est Lex).”-  
Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman author, orator and politician, 106 BC-43 BC 
 
 
4.1 The Maghreb region at the center of maritime security 
 concerns in the Mediterranean arena 
  
 For decades, Maghreb maritime security has been a sensitive issue for policy 
makers, legislators and strategists, generating numerous debates on both sides of the 
Mediterranean Sea. As mentioned in the previous chapters, little has changed on 
stowaways, drugs, contraband goods by sea and related security issues. Even though 
stowaway legislation and procedures have strengthened in the Maghreb region, they 
are still a headache for the policy makers and the shipping industry. The ISM 
Code195 and the ISPS Code196 did not create sufficient impact in resolving these 
threats; their effects are still insignificant in reducing the level of the menace to a 
minimum acceptable standard anticipated by the whole maritime community as they 
were intended to foster positive continuous improvements in those States in the 
Maghreb. The consequential costs and delays generated by such incidents were not 
previously considered by the shipowners and other stakeholders of the maritime 
                                                 
195 See Phil Anderson, ISM Code: A practical guide to the legal and insurance implications, 2nd ed., 
London: Lloyd’s Practical Shipping Guides (LLP), 2005 at p.155 and p.164. Criminal liability and 
insurance implications are highlighted by the author. Failure to comply with the Code may give rise to 
criminal sanctions under the legislation implementing the Code itself in various jurisdictions.   
196 See Regina Asariotis, “Implementation of the ISPS Code: an overview of recent developments”, Journal 
of International Maritime Law, Vol.12, No.6, July-August 2005, at pp.275-276. Particular areas of concern 
among interested parties in the shipping industry are exposed, particularly those concerning the access and 
boarding procedures of ships and the fact that the uniform observance of mandatory regulations imposed by 
the ISPS Code is still not achieved. The recent cases on stowaways, drugs and contraband by sea in the 
Maghreb have highlighted the differences in compliance and illustrated that the control measures are still 
insufficient to counter these threats. 
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 sector, and thus resulted in numerous complex issues, where all the actors involved 
in the maritime adventure were confronted by an explosion of claims and had to find 
the most appropriate countermeasures to reduce the effects of such threats. 
   
 The role of the Maritime Administration of the flag State197is critical, because 
it performs a number of crucial tasks within this context. As an authority issuing 
certificates of compliance, the flag State is a key player involved in the whole 
maritime security system198 . In the Maghreb, even though the complete security 
management process was done by different States involved on the due date for 
implementation of the ISPS Code, the risks shifted and new challenges were faced by 
policy makers and the shipping industry who had to respond proactively to these new 
threats. As mentioned by Mejia, “the new regime is complicated and the various 
threats perceived worldwide, as well as the varying readiness of States to implement 
IMO instruments…..”199, have been brought to light during the recent years; and the 
manner in which they have been done, was influenced by numerous and complex 
factors. The latest data and graphs from the Maghreb region are shown in Annexes C 
and D; they highlight the effects of these differences on global shipping and the sea 
trade. In particular, the recent events and incidents related to stowaways, drugs and 
contraband which occurred in the Maghreb States confirmed the previous hypothesis 
put forward by this writer when analyzing the allocation of responsibilities with 
respect to maritime security assessments and risk analysis of various port incidents 
                                                 
197 See UNCLOS 82, article 94 regarding the duties of the flag state. 
198 The ISPS Code in Part A, Section 4.1 stipulates clearly the responsibilities of contracting governments 
related to the security levels, guidance for protection from security incidents, and Section 4.3 sets out the 
security related duties which may be delegated to a recognized security organization (RSO) and those 
which may not, such as approving port facility security assessment (PFSA) and port facility security plan 
(PFSP), their subsequent amendments, setting of the applicable security level, determining the port 
facilities which will be required to designate a port facility security officer (PFSO), exercising the controls 
and compliance measures pursuant to regulation XI-2/9, and establishing clearly the requirements regarding 
the Declaration of Security (DOS). A test of effectiveness of approved ship security plans and port facility 
security plans as well as the amendments to them, which the flag States have approved or those which have 
been approved on their behalf must be done at regular interval to ensure the system is efficient and effective 
all the time. 
199 See Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, a selection of papers and 
presentations from the Workshop-Symposium on the Practical Implementation and Critical Evaluation of 
the ISPS Code 11-15 August 2003 and the International Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Maritime 
Security 30 August to 1 September 2004, Malmö: WMU, 2005 at pp.9-15. 
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 and the link between causes and consequences related to flag states, companies and 
ships entitled to fly their flags, and masters’ responsibilities.  
4.2 New legal approaches and the revision of existing maritime  
 security regimes: a possible solution for policy makers 
 
 The threats generated by poor enforcement regimes have legal and 
commercial consequences which are borne by all parties involved in the maritime 
shipping sector and sea trade. Therefore, a proactive approach should be taken by the 
national authorities through various reviews of the existing policies and 
implementation processes already in force in their jurisdictions. Additionally, a 
continuous security reassessment of port facilities and ships entitled to fly their flags 
should be done according to a regular schedule in the Maghreb region, as stipulated 
by the ISPS Code and national law, in order that national designated authorities who 
are charged with the responsibility to verify the whole risk management system and 
to control the efficiency and effectiveness of all approved plans and procedures in 
force since 1st July 2004, could act accordingly. New legal and ergonomic 
considerations 200  as well as law and economics of maritime security 201  aspects 
should be taken into account by policy makers and legislators when drafting 
legislation and/or inserting amendments into existing instruments in their domestic 
law, and when attempting to promote security awareness and reduce to a minimum 
                                                 
200 See Proshanto K. Mukherjee and Max Mejia, “The ISPS Code: legal and ergonomic considerations”, in 
Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, a selection of papers and 
presentations from the Workshop-Symposium on the Practical Implementation and Critical Evaluation of 
the ISPS Code 11-15 August 2003 and the International Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Maritime 
Security 30 August to 1 September 2004, Malmö: WMU, 2005 at pp.40-44. The authors have emphasized 
the human behavioral and biological characteristics, which influence the human interaction with the system. 
They have also focused on the norms adopted by IMO in rule-making as well as the different steps and 
processes involved in the implementation of the ISPS Code. Finally, an in-depth analysis on the subject is 
provided to highlight the changes taking place in the legal maritime security arena, bringing to light the 
need for new considerations and initiatives by all the actors involved in reviewing legal issues related to 
this sensitive domain of “maritime security awareness”. 
201 See Jingjing Xu, “The law and economics of maritime security:  selected issues in perspective”, in 
Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, a selection of papers and 
presentations from the Workshop-Symposium on the Practical Implementation and Critical Evaluation of 
the ISPS Code 11-15 August 2003 and the International Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Maritime 
Security 30 August to 1 September 2004, Malmö: WMU, 2005 at pp.319-329. 
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 the number of incidents related to the threats described in this dissertation. 
Additionally, private law aspects and commercial concerns 202  associated with 
emerging issues in the domain of maritime security should be considered when 
analyzing the available data and annual reports on incidents occurring in Maghreb’s 
ports or aboard ships while in their jurisdictions. Trade facilitation and the shipping 
industry interests must be preserved and policy makers should tackle these sensitive 
issues from all sides and perspectives to identify the most appropriate methods to be 
used when assessing, evaluating, reviewing and implementing new legal perspectives 
to their national legislation. The improvement of preventive and remedial security 
measures depends on the methods and concepts used during the different steps 
concerned by the review process as well as the result of cost-benefit-analysis. 
 
Figure 10: Flow chart “Implementation Process” (ISPS Code - SOLAS, Ch.XI-2)  
 
 As described in Figure 10, a top down approach should be carried out when 
implementing the ISPS Code by the Contracting Government. The policy makers, 
legislators and experts in maritime security may use this flow chart during the review 
stage to identify different responsibilities 203  and tasks to be undertaken by the 
numerous actors involved in the whole system. Three security levels are to be 
                                                 
202 Delays, restriction of maritime commercial operations, detention or expulsion of vessels from ports have 
huge impacts on the costs suffered by the shipowners or charterers and any other trading party involved. 
203 See the responsibilities of contracting governments, obligations of companies and ships (ISPS code). 
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 considered by a State Party, desiring to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of its 
implementation process by giving a clear picture on what should be done and which 
entity is entitled to do it according to the mandatory provisions of part A of the ISPS 
Code and the requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2.  
 
 The maritime security verification surveys are conducted by Flag State 
Administrations 204  or Recognized Security Organizations (RSO) acting on their 
behalf, to ensure that the security system at all levels of the different parties involved, 
comply with the requirements stipulated in the ISPS Code part A and SOLAS 
chapter XI-2, and should be conducted in accordance with internationally accepted 
audit practices, such as ISO 10011-1. 
 
  The IMO guidelines are useful documents giving clear guidance on how to 
address the different issues at all levels, and thus, policy makers may find important 
information on required standards, development of procedures and implementation 
processes. The flows of information and communication channels used to manage 
the system are vital components which must be taken into account by all parties 
involved at the different management levels. It should be done internally as well as 
externally to improve the flow of security information. 
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Figure 11: Flow of security information between the Maghreb region & IMO 
                                                 
204 See section 4 and 19 Part/ A and the guidance given in Part/B, ISPS Code for the requirements regarding 
flag State Administrations responsibilities as well as those stipulated in the different sub-sections related to 
the main parts of the Code and under the regulations of chapter XI-2, SOLAS 74, as amended. 
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Figure 12: Flow chart “Security Information” (ISPS Code - SOLAS, Ch.XI-2) 
  
  As mentioned in Figure 12, the reporting system and flow of security 
information related to the different threats, incidents, events, data and other related 
security matters are important components of the system, and are vital to ensure a 
continuous up dating and exchanges of security information at the security level 
decided by the competent national authorities. Policy makers may use it as a tool to 
improve the grey areas in the system and when they are reviewing existing laws.  
 
 The establishment of a stowaway focal point (SFP) at IMO is an important 
proactive step to focus, improve the management of security related information, and 
obtain up dated data on attempted stowaways/stowaways incidents from Contracting 
Governments. However, incidents on smuggling drugs on board ships / port facilities 
or related issues should be considered by IMO, as well as the phenomenon of 
contraband goods, endangering the maritime adventure in many parts of the world205. 
Clear reports and statistics on those incidents or presumed events, should be provided 
by Contracting Governments to present an overview of the subject.  
                                                 
205 Colley West Shipping Company Ltd. v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2006 FC 1419. The 
court stated that the application for judicial review of a decision ordering the agent to pay the costs of 
deporting a stowaway who had entered Canada illegally was allowed and the demand for payment quashed. 
This case highlights the immigration and deportation costs issues and the liability of agent for stowaways. 
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  These reports or data may be useful in examining in-depth the root causes and 
consequences of those previously enumerated threats, hence, furnishing in the short 
term the possibility of obtaining efficient and effective procedures, which may assist 
many States in combating such maritime crimes. New guidelines on these sensitive 
issues, delivered under IMO auspices would be a revolutionary step in tackling 
proactively this modern cancer with its various metastases, threatening the whole 
shipping industry, as long as globalization and the increase of sea trade are the fixed 
goals for the coming years.  
 
 New concerns on this sensitive subject have been considered by the European 
Union (EU)206 and many reports from its member States in 2007 here highlighted the 
growing risks existing in the Mediterranean Sea arena. Since the Maghreb region is 
at the centre of their preoccupations and the problem is localized in these transit 
countries, the solutions to maritime security issues will remain a huge challenge207.  
 
 From the Maghreb perspective, new legal regimes and amendments are 
urgently needed including the incorporation of proactive approaches by the member 
States into their national legislation, to counter attempted stowaways and stowaways’ 
incidents, smuggling of drugs and contraband goods offences, occurring widely as 
indicated in published reports of IMO, UNODC, WCO and EUROPOL on the 
subject. These threats cover numerous serious crimes which are aimed at financial 
and private gain, usually masterminded by organized crime syndicates which 
facilitate the illegal transport aboard ships of the outlaw commodities and unlawful 
entry into States, through port facilities in countries of origin, as well as in countries 
of destination. Urgent efforts to tackle these sensitive issues at a macro level is the 
                                                 
206  See EU directives 2005/65/EC, regulation (EC) No. 725/2004, adopted the 31 March 2004, on 
enhancing ship and port facility security  and the Commission regulation (EC) No. 884/2005 of 10 June 
2005, laying down procedures for conducting Commission inspection in the field of maritime security, as 
well as related reports published by the European Union Commissions and their policy implications within 
the community and related costs shared among the States to implement efficiently and effectively the 
security measures adopted in the EU. <www.eur-lex.europa.eu >, (July 2007). 
207 See Europol report, “Organized Illegal immigration into the European Union”, The Hague (Netherlands): 
Europol, January 2007, <http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Serious_Crime_Overviews/ Facilitated 
_Illegal_ Immigration_FactSheeet2007.pdf>,  (July 25, 2007). 
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 first approach, and later at a micro level, attempts need to be made to identify the 
most appropriate countermeasures to eliminate the risks generated by many grey 
areas and gaps in national legislation, ports regulations, companies’ and ships’ 
procedures. In particular, those described threats menacing the sea trade and 
endangering the whole shipping sector, bringing to light new concerns to policy 
makers and legislators in the Maghreb region, such as the criminalization of 
seafarers208, marine insurance claims and numerous other apprehensions from the 
different involved parties must be carefully analyzed when drafting legislation and 
pushing new regulations or rules into the national security arena.  
4.3 Maritime Security Incidents Mapping Concept and Analysis: 
 new perspectives for policy makers  
 
 Another point adding to the debate on these issues is related to the problem of 
false documents used by the stowaways or provided by criminal organizations to 
smugglers and traffickers involved in various forms of crimes or offences which 
were not considered previously by policy makers and legislators, regarding the type, 
nature and form of these new menaces and the appropriate sanctions, penalties and 
fines to be incorporated into the existing legislation. Facilitated maritime criminal 
                                                 
208 See Proshanto K. Mukherjee, “Criminalization and unfair treatment: the seafarer’s perspective”, Journal 
of International Maritime Law, vol. 12, No.5, September- October 2006, at pp.325-336. The author stated 
that “Criminalization with reference to a person means turning someone into a criminal by making his or 
her activity illegal. Thus, a person is criminalized if that person’s conduct or act is criminal”. The 
punishments or the imposition of penal sanctions which defines a crime and permits to distinguish it from a 
tort or delict, considered as civil wrong.  Also, a clear distinction between criminal offence and an offence 
must be made by the policy makers and legislators when drafting legislation. An offence is more considered 
as a public welfare or regulatory offence, whereas, a criminal offence is depending on the proof of mens rea. 
The author highlights clearly the distinction between mens rea offences and those characterized as strict 
liability or half way house offences. These offences are based on proof of actus reus. Criminal offences are 
based on the general principle “maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”, meaning that “only a guilty 
mind makes an act criminal”. The provisions in the penal regimes indicate whether an offence is considered 
as a mens rea or actus reus offence. In the maritime  regulatory regimes arena,  they are considered as 
“violations” under the SOLAS Convention, ISPS Code requirements, MARPOL Convention, etc. Safety, 
security and pollution offences often belong to the half-way house category as mentioned by professor 
Mukherjee. Another important point highlighted by the author is to avoid seafarers to be assimilated as 
scapegoats or victims of existing gaps in legal regimes, resulting in an unfair punishment in many cases. 
Human rights and particularly fundamental rights in the treatment of seafarers should be considered by the 
policy makers and legislators when drafting legislation and transforming violations under regulatory 
regimes into offences in domestic law.  
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 activities in their broad sense cover the production and procurement of falsified 
documents, providing false visa and permits to presumed stowaways, refugees, or 
asylum seekers seeking to get access by any available means to port facilities and 
aboard ships. In the worst case scenario, terrorists smuggled as stowaways hidden on 
board commercial vessels escape the country of origin and enter illegally a foreign 
territory to commit unlawful acts against defined targets. In this context, policy 
makers face complex issues. Dealing with these offences is a huge challenge as well 
as a dilemma for unprepared Administrations with regard to the most appropriate 
procedures, countermeasures and responses to this menace. Thus, any maritime 
crime is revealed as a serious complex problem for the legislator in terms of 
categorization according to the existing law. 
 
 Considering the different UN treaties on the subject and their implementation 
into the national field is another challenge or dilemma for policy makers and 
legislators. Issues of organized crime, corruption, trafficking in human beings, 
counter terrorism, transnational offences, illegal migration, smuggling of drugs by 
ships or other means of transport by sea, contraband of goods and criminal justice 
reforms, etc., imply huge sacrifice on the part of the people involved in grappling 
with these sensitive security matters, as not only expertise in the field is required, but 
also the participation of the whole society to preserve the social interests209. State 
responsibility210, sovereignty and national interests have a bearing on solving these 
emerging problems. Strict application of the laws and their punishments as stipulated 
by the existing instruments in the domestic field here featured prominently in 
determining the most appropriate sanctions to eliminate these threats. However, their 
                                                 
209 Security policies are often confronted with strong social, political, and economic interests. Government 
failures to tackle these sensitive maritime security issues, discussed in this chapter may generate conflicts 
and claims which hamper policy makers in finding a balanced way to satisfy all parties involved in the 
problem. Social interests are numerous and must be considered when studying the market and externalities. 
210 See U.N document A/ CN.4/ 315, “ force majeure” and “ fortuitous event” as circumstances precluding  
wrongfulness: survey of State practice, international judicial decisions and doctrine-study prepared by the 
Secretariat on: “State responsibility”, extract from the year book of the International Law Commission, 
1978,vol.II(1) at p.91.See also ILC articles 1,2, 3, 4 and 5, General Principles on State responsibility, 
wrongful acts under international law, elements of an internationally wrongful acts of a State, 
characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful  and the notion of “ Act of the State”. 
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 effects are insufficient in light of the latest reported incidents in the Maghreb region. 
Preventive measures211 are the most important factors to be considered in protecting 
critical infrastructures, port facilities, companies and ships, and reducing the 
vulnerabilities and risks generated by such threats. Remedial measures or mitigation 
actions212come into play only after the incident occurs and provide the last barrier 
before the existing defense system collapses and affects the general security, safety 
and environment around it.  
 
 When drafting legislation or implementing new regulations and rules into the 
existing legislation213, policy makers and legislators must keep in mind those details 
and try to revise all existing instruments according to the expressed needs, available 
data and statistics, reports from recognized experts on the subject, as well as the flow 
of information at internal and external levels which may predict the likelihood of the 
situation in advance and thus allow  immediate actions to be taken to minimize risks 
and potential consequences in the short-term. For the long-term, a strict policy 
analysis on the subject must be undertaken214. A closer look at analytical functions is 
also needed, because the nature of policy analysis can vary widely215. As mentioned 
by Weimer and Vining, “Public policy encourages, discourages, prohibits, or 
prescribes private actions. Beginning with the premise that individuals generally act 
in their own best interests, policy analysts bear the burden of providing the rationale 
for any governmental interference with private choice. The burden applies to 
evaluating existing policies as well as new initiatives”216. As a primordial element in 
any analysis, it frequently provides the best initial insight into complex situations, 
                                                 
211 Preventive measures are those implemented to prevent any incident or event to occur. 
212 Mitigation actions are those measures in place to be used after an incident occurred to mitigate its effects. 
213 Supra, see footnote 188 at p.53. See, transformation of conventions into national legislation at p.217. 
214 See David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, Policy Analysis: concept and practice, 3rd ed., New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall , Inc., 1998, at pp.28-34.  
215 Ibid. at p.39, the author states that a structured analysis that assesses problems, systematically compares 
alternatives for solving them.  Policy makers must have an understanding of political and organizational 
behavior in order to predict and influence the feasibility of adoption and successful implementation of 
policies. Technical skills are required as well as a framework for ethics. 
216 Ibid. at p.58, the author emphasizes the efficiency of the ideal conceptual model and suggests taking into 
consideration other factors, such as human dignity, the promotion of fairness, distributional equity, 
economic opportunity and political participation, etc. 
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 which is the case in stowaways, smuggling and trafficking issues. Rationale for 
public policy must be taken into account by policy makers, such as social welfare, 
values, norms, habits, customs, conventions and other factors that influence or affect 
directly the decision-making process. Additionally, the political feasibility and social 
indicators217 must also be considered in drafting legislation or amending regulations 
in the existing instruments. Another point to be considered is related to the costs 
generated by regulations218. Both law and the economics of maritime security are 
important components which should be considered when analyzing in-depth security 
incidents which will give a global overview of the different costs shared by the 
various parties involved 219 and provide the necessary tools and concepts in 
overcoming budgetary constraints or interpreting economic effects caused by new 
security measures or countermeasures implemented by policy makers to solve the 
problem. Law and economics analysis of a security incident could assist investigators 
to determine the costs and policy impacts generated by such an event. Thus, 
incentives, opportunity costs, market mechanisms and prices deducted from the in-
depth study of the security incident are vital components to be considered. They 
provide the most efficient economic approach to law and policy adoption by using 
Pareto or Kaldor-Hick efficiency220 concepts according to the case and available 
parameters to measure the certainty and severity of punishment. Preventive measures 
                                                 
217 Social indicators are measures of changes in social welfare, such as unemployment rate, inflation, 
balance of payment, gross and net national product, etc.   
218 Supra, footnote 214 at p.64. It was mentioned that “regulations can be extremely costly and that they 
operate often through command and control”, and “directives are given, compliance is monitored, and non 
compliance is punished”. If there is extensive consumer demand for cheap prohibited items or illegal 
products, the result is increase of smuggling and contraband as well as black markets, which are generating 
deadweight losses and negative externalities. In the context of criminal sanctions, severe punishments may 
provide a powerful deterrent, but they may also discourage security agencies or other parties involved from 
reporting incidents or events on the discussed threats as mentioned in this dissertation.  
219 Supra, footnote 201 at p.57. See pp.322-323. The author highlights the utility of optimal level of 
prevention in terms of cost and benefit for analyzing costs of security incidents. 
220 See James R. Seldon, “Efficacy, effectiveness and efficiency in human resource use: a primer on the 
three e’s,” International Journal of Public Administration, Vol.16, No.7, 1993 at pp.921-943. The author 
highlights the disputes over resource use, particularly in the public sector and opines that technical 
efficiency requires getting the most from inputs and allocative efficiency is by far the most problematic. 
The Pareto principle states that “resources are being used incorrectly if redeploying inputs or redistributing 
outputs which can add benefits for some members of society without harming any others”. The Kaldor 
Hicks approach in part overcomes these limitations, but it has a price and sanctions which may imply a 
willingness to accept its implications by the society. Efficiency is promoted when the total expected social 
costs are reduced.  
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 and remedial measures must be analyzed separately and carefully. The cost-benefit 
analysis of the scenario and different actions involved enable the determination of 
the cost-effectiveness of the used security system. Policy makers, legislators and 
investigators should keep in mind these basic concepts while seeking to find out the 
most appropriate solutions to the problem by utilizing economic principles when 
analyzing maritime security incidents.  
  
 In seeking to widen efforts to increase maritime security awareness in the 
shipping world, IMO needs to consider new proposals for the international maritime 
community and should call  for new solutions to grapple with these challenges, 
which have highlighted various deficiencies221. The initiative of introducing a new 
member-state scheme will herald a new period in the regulation and protection of 
shipping and port industries. Thus, flag States should be expected to provide 
minimum standards of services by ensuring the quality of its services and the training 
of its personnel involved in policing and managing maritime security processes.222
 
 The review of law and policy issues relevant to the “maritime crimes”223 is an 
urgent necessity. Maritime security incidents analysed from an ergonomic 
perspective by using the general principles of law and ergonomics, based on a 
macro-level analysis, permits the identification of the most relevant active and latent 
                                                 
221 David Osler,  “IMO to trial Stowaway repatriation aid service”, Lloyd’s List, (August 8, 2007). IMO 
established a “Stowaway Focal Point” (FSP) to assist shipowners and masters in repatriation issues, and to 
offer assistance as well as support for the disembarkation of stowaways.  
222 See, “IMO audit plan to benefit flags”, Trade winds, Vol.16, No.50, (December 16, 2005). 
223 See Max Mejia Jr. and Proshanto, K. Mukherjee, “The SUA Convention 2005: a critical evaluation of its 
effectiveness in suppressing maritime criminal acts”, The Journal of International Maritime Law, Vol.12, 
No.3, May – June 2006, at pp.170-191. Professor Mukherjee highlights the need to clearly define a 
“maritime crime”, because the existing conventions in the regulatory arena or in the criminal field do not 
give a clear and concise explanation on what is considered as a maritime crime as well as the listing of such 
offences considered as a crime according to international law.  The SUA 88 Convention mentions only 
unlawful acts and deals with a very narrow range of offences. Also, UNCLOS 82 is very limited in the 
range of offences considered as maritime crimes or falling under the category of maritime violence. It deals 
mainly with piratical acts on the high seas. The need to broaden the scope to include new offences is 
necessary and urgent. Additionally, a clear definition on what is a maritime terrorism act is also needed. In 
the existing international instruments, no definition on terrorism or maritime terrorist act is found, therefore, 
policy makers and legislators must act proactively, and member States must urge IMO to tackle these issues 
by redefining certain acts unclearly stated and poorly drafted. Globalization and advanced technology as 
well as the increase of sea trade push maritime security in the forefront to combat and eliminate all new 
threats which may come to light with time.  
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 conditions224 that allowed the event to occur. It is a powerful tool for users, if they 
manage adequately and correctly the concepts proposed in it225.  
 
 The interpretation of the available information provided in the “Security 
Incident Map” (SecInciMap) 226  may offer to policy makers, legislators and 
investigators relevant means for in-depth analysis of a complete real scenario related 
to one of the following threats;  stowaways, smuggling drugs or contraband goods by 
sea. Consequently, recommendations based on findings may be used to improve the 
existing maritime security law and policy, because the SecInciMap in this case, 
reconstituted as a “Maritime Crime Incident Map” (MarCrimInciMap), can offer a 
clear view of the deterrent factors, the topography and configuration of scenery and 
equipment, and the flow of events and acts in a chronological order. Also, this 
concept which may be adapted to maritime crimes and events highlights the gaps and 
grey areas found at different levels of management involved in the incident, at the 
national level from the top level down to the operational level, with regard to the 
existing international instruments.  
 
 This method allows the identification of the areas in law and existing policies 
at various levels, which need improvement or new input to counter and prevent such 
incidents from occurring in the future. A clear security assessment of the ship as well 
as port facilities is needed; thus, it implies a perfect risk security assessment process 
                                                 
224 See Maximo  Q. Mejia Jr. and Roland Akselsson, ““AcciMapping” Maritime Security Incidents: a Pilot 
Study”, Malmö: WMU, 2007,  at pp.2-4. Adaptation of the Jens Rasmussen and Inge Svedung AcciMap 
and the promotion of risk management tools are highlighted by the authors as well as the “active 
conditions” which mean “conditions that have an immediate impact and contributory effect in allowing the 
occurrence of a maritime security incident”, and “latent conditions” which are those conditions that “can lie 
dormant for a period of time doing no particular harm until they interact with local circumstances to defeat 
the system’s defences”. These are mentioned by Mejia based on a study done by Reason in 1997. 
225 See Jens-Uwe Schröder, “Shipboard Security”, ISPS Code Workshop, Malmö: WMU, December 2005. 
An important step to ensure a perfectly proactive security management system is to implement the most 
appropriate risk management process to shipboard security as well as to port facilities security. However, 
port security is more complex and is broader regarding internal and external factors influencing the whole 
system.  
226 See Jens Rasmussen and Inge Svedung, Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic Society, Karlstad: 
Risk center, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 2000, at p.11. An example of SecInciMap for a security 
incident is provided in Annex M. 
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 to obtain the best cost-benefit measures related to the considered system, as 
mentioned by Schröder.227
 
 The main objective of this maritime security incident map is to provide 
legislators and policy makers with a powerful tool for maritime security management. 
The “SecInciMap”, used in assessing maritime security or crimes, may assist in 
investigating cases, employing macro-level analysis and providing findings, and 
finally in assisting the formulation of proposals.  
 
 The use of new approaches and concepts is to demonstrate and prove their 
utility by analyzing a maritime security incident, in order to: 
 
• identify significant factors in order to bring to light the most relevant 
active and latent conditions; 
• conduct a vertical, macro-level analysis of that incident; 
• construct and explore the SecInciMap ; and to 
• detect the most appropriate solutions to eliminate inadequate security 
measures existing in the system.228  
 
 As mentioned by Mukherjee and Mejia, “Perhaps, the most significant feature 
of the ISPS Code is that in contrast with UNCLOS, the SUA Convention, and the 
CMI’s model national law which all deal with criminal law, the ISPS Code arguably 
deals with ergonomics, i.e. it attempts to influence the behavior of seafarers and port 
managers through elaborate regulatory procedures as preventive measures in relation 
                                                 
227 See in Annex O, the general security risk assessment process flow chart. The author highlights the 
difference between safety and security in risk management. “Safety analysis and investigation is based on 
unplanned events causing disturbance in the system”, whereas, “security focuses on activities planned or 
designated to cause disturbances in systems. Policy makers should be aware of these differences and make 
a clear dispatch when safety or security purposes are considered, while drafting legislation. See Jens-Uwe 
Schröder, “An Introduction to Shipboard Security Risk Assessment”, in Max Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary 
Issues in Maritime Security, Malmö: WMU, 2005, at pp.101-116. 
228Supra, footnote 224 at p.67.  Mejia addressed the objectives of this mapping method and the validity as 
well as the reliability of the interpretation of its results found or expected in a security incident analysis. 
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 to combating criminal offences that pose a threat to maritime security” 229 , 
highlighting the usefulness of ergonomics in the maritime security arena by trying to 
solve the problem and finding the deficiencies to be eliminated. Thus, SecInciMap or 
MarCrimMap are tools which may assist, help and provide the means needed by 
policy makers when tackling sensitive security issues or investigating maritime 
criminal cases or acts, and finding the different gaps related to the responsibilities, 
duties and procedures at all management levels as well as in the existing legal 
regimes. 
 
 Maritime security incident or events are investigated to identify the causes of 
their occurrence and to determine the actions that must be taken by the decision 
makers to prevent recurrence. These security incidents are rarely simple and almost 
never result from a single cause that could be immediately identified. Thus, the flow 
of events in cases of stowaways or attempted stowaways230, smuggling of drugs or 
contraband goods by sea is vital for highlighting the grey areas that need 
improvement.  Policy makers should be aware of the gamut of existing models and 
tools in the shipping industry and other related sectors. Events and causal factor 
charts are very helpful, but usually the skeleton changes until the maximum 
information is gathered on the security incident and the chart is fully completed and 
up dated.  
 
 Thus, a chart on the management systems investigated at all management 
level after a maritime crime or any maritime security incident occurred is provided in 
Annex Q. It highlights all levels of responsibilities involved in case of an event or 
incident and provides a clear picture of the scene to be scrutinized. 
                                                 
229 See Proshanto K.  Mukherjee and Max Mejia Jr. , “Selected issues of law and ergonomics in maritime 
security”, Journal of International Maritime Law, Vol.10, No.4, August- September 2004, at p.323. The 
authors highlight the various changes that affect the international regimes for maritime security as well as 
several new initiatives which should be considered by policy makers and legislators when transforming 
international instruments into domestic law. The legal frame work on the subject falling under public 
international law, regulatory and criminal law should be carefully reviewed to find out the most appropriate 
countermeasures to reduce or eliminate the existing grey areas and deficiencies found in the existing 
instruments. A revision of UNCLOS 82 which may act as an umbrella is suggested by the authors. This 
approach in the long term will encourage transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and good governance.  
230 See BIMCO, “Stowaways”, BIMCO Bulletin, Vol.102, No.3, June 200, at p.91. 
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  Finally, policy makers, legislators and maritime security investigators should 
use the SecInciMap as a powerful tool which may assist in drafting legislation or 
preparing reports to correct the deficiencies found in the complete in-depth study of 
the considered case or scenario231.  
 
 The recommended practices for assisting policy makers or investigators in 
cases of maritime security incidents (minor, moderate or major) may be summarized 
as follows232: 
1. Receive the complete report of the maritime security incident or final 
judgment of the case (trial); 
2. Organize the incident data, witnesses, newspapers, literature, other reports 
and information, etc.; 
3. Identify and confirm the validity of the deterrent factors related to the 
criminal intent as well as the active and latent conditions that allowed the 
maritime security incident to occur; 
4. Develop a vertical, macro-level analysis of the maritime security incident by 
using a top down approach as mentioned in Figure 13; 
5. Illustrate  the flow of events and acts; 
6. Use the conventional symbols to illustrate deterrent factors, active and latent 
conditions, primary and secondary events, etc.; 
7. Construct the MarCrimInciMap/SecInciMap; 
8. Make the first assessment and review the findings; 
9. Review the SecInciMap and do a second assessment to confirm all deterrent 
factors contributing to the criminal intent and check  the latent and active 
conditions found through the interpretation of the Map; 
10. Establish the final report on the assessed case or maritime security incident 
by describing each step and summarize the findings; 
11. Provide to the interested parties the lessons to be learned after the in-depth 
study of this maritime security incident; 
12. Furnish all details and the complete report to the Maritime Training Institutes 
and Universities to be transmitted to all maritime students and professionals 
the lessons to be learned to avoid such incidents from occurring again;  
13. Provide all shipping companies, ports and ships entitled to fly the flag of the 
country with the findings and recommendations;  
14. Finally, review the existing laws relating to this maritime security incident, 
and if necessary propose amendments or any other equivalent proactive 
measures to eliminate or reduce such threats. 
                                                 
231 See Theodore Sampson, Maritime Risk Analysis and Management: existing practices, existing needs, 
LUCRAM, Lund: Lund University Centre for Risk Analysis and Management (LUCRAM), 2002. 
232 Supra, footnote 224 at p.67. Mejia describes all steps and approaches to be implemented to obtain a 
preliminary and subsequently a final assessment of the maritime security incident by using correctly the 
SecInciMap and to deduct all factors which contributed to the occurrence of the event. 
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Top down 
approach 
Figure 13:       Law and ergonomics- ISPS Code: new perspectives to investigate criminal intents 
 
Figure 13 highlights the usefulness of a top down approach in searching the failures. 
4.4 The response of the shipping and port industries and other 
 stakeholders  
  
 Morocco remains a source of stowaways and high risk zone for contraband 
goods and smuggling of drugs, whereas, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania are areas 
affected by migrant stowaways. Since the recent past, these areas have been 
threatened by new drug routes used by transnational organized gangs with 
international ramifications. Contraband in this region is very popular and policy 
makers or legislators face serious issues due to the tolerance of the black markets by 
authorities, highlighting the complexity of the problem, which is increasing 
according to Europol’s latest report in 2007233 on the subject. Another point to be 
considered is that many stowaways migrate to other countries before boarding ocean-
going vessels to Europe or destinations as far as the North American continent. 
                                                 
233 See “EU organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA)”, 2007, Europol, The Hague: Europol, 2007,  
< www.europol.europa.eu  >, (July, 2007). Also, the Annual Report 2006, Europol is relevant regarding 
these threats menacing the two sides of the Mediterranean Sea. See also WCO’s reports on drugs offences.  
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 Policy makers and all parties involved in the maritime adventure trading in or out the 
Maghreb Region should be aware of this information provided by international 
organizations or agencies, giving the latest trends and data on the subject. On board 
commercial vessels, it is crucial that crews are familiar with IMO’s guidelines on 
stowaways and illegal migrants by sea, drugs and other crimes considered as 
maritime crimes. When, the stowaways are found hidden onboard vessels, masters 
have to inform immediately their owners and operators, P& I Clubs and document all 
actions carefully for further investigation reports or inspections. Human rights must 
be preserved as well as fair treatment 234 . P& I Clubs have the expertise on 
repatriation 235 , but recently IMO has established the Stowaway Focal Point, the 
object of which is to manage the reports and data on the subject by assisting in 
repatriation issues as well as disembarkation of stowaways, facilitation of diplomatic 
responses to resolve stowaway cases when restrained on board vessels or detained, to 
promote security awareness among all actors involved in the shipping business, and 
to consider the claims of  other parties directly or indirectly affected by the menace.  
 
 As mentioned in the previous chapters, the risks of stowaways, smuggling of 
drugs and contraband issues are high in the Maghreb region, therefore policy makers 
of those involved States, should reinforce and strengthen controls and preventive 
measures in their ports as mandated by the ISPS Code. Particular emphasis should be 
placed on port security and port facilities assessment to enhance the standards 
adopted and required by IMO and the internationally agreed principles on the subject. 
Waterfronts, accesses to the infrastructures or adjacent areas, corruption issues, false 
documents and other related sensitive matters should be reconsidered and reassessed 
according to the available statistics and trends. 
                                                 
234 See Ernie Forster, “Unwanted guests that can cause a host of troubles”, Lloyd’s List, (June 9, 2006). The 
recent incident in Durban in South Africa highlighted the difficulties faced by the shipping industry when 
the master and three crew members were arrested and prosecuted under culpable homicide.  After 
considerable debate, at the end they were heavily fined and received suspended prison sentences. In this 
episode, the master and crew failed to declare to the owner their presence on board the ship and were 
friendly to them, allowing them to climb down a rope to swim to the nearest quay. However, two of the 
seven drowned and the survivors declared to the authorities that they had been forced off the ship.  
235 See Sam Ignarsky, “Home Office could tap into P & I expertise on repatriation”, Lloyd’s List,  
(May 17, 2006).  
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  Thus, ensuring an effective, coherent and humane response to all these threats 
remains a major challenge to these concerned States and their policy makers as well 
as to the shipping industry and its stakeholders. Prevention, cooperation, discipline 
and order at sea, proactive measures and other solutions should be encouraged at all 
levels by providing rights to victims, reinforcing border controls as well as water 
patrols, and giving all possible means to the relevant actors including ports, police, 
customs, coast guards, navies and intelligence services to counter this menace by 
promoting efficiency, effectiveness and awareness. Investigation, prosecution and 
procedural measures and procedures should be reviewed to determine the most 
appropriate barriers to protect all interests involved in the system, thus enhancing sea 
trade and commerce in general.  
 
 The shipping industry should be aware of the relevant provisions of the UN 
Vienna Convention, 1988, particularly articles 17, §3 and 4 under which according to 
the existing agreements or arrangements between those Parties, the flag State may 
authorize the requesting State to “board the vessel, search the vessel or if evidence of 
involvement in illicit traffic is found, take appropriate action with respect to the 
vessel, persons and cargo on board”. Therefore, shipping companies should provide 
masters and crew on board their ships all documents236 related to drug smuggling, 
contraband and other related offences, and establish clear procedures to deal with 
such security incidents in the case of an event ensuring that audits are carried out and 
the overall process is monitored and controlled according to the requirements of the 
ISM and ISPS Codes. The designated person ashore and the CSO should be held 
                                                 
236 IMO/ILO guidelines should be provided for all crew members before the ship leaves port and to 
seafarers training centres as pedagogic support to familiarize and train mariners in combating such threats 
by using all available legal instruments and guidelines to enhance maritime security awareness. See 
“Stowaways and refugees”, BIMCO, (August 1, 2007). The author highlights causes, such as the great 
divisions between the poor and rich countries, the growing sense of desperation while legal migration is 
increasingly tightened and monitored. Thus, numerous stowaways have died after they had hidden 
themselves in dangerous places on board vessels, such as in containers or ship’s holds without ventilation, 
ending in tragic and dramatic conclusions. The shipping industry is very involved in these sensible issues as 
it was mentioned by the BIMCO author, because ships are used as a means of escape from misery and 
unemployment by desperate people from different nationalities and continents, risking their lives for a 
better future. Also, the urgent need to assist these wretched people and to put them in a safe haven or place 
with regard to human fundamental rights, interception issues and safety concerns are highlighted. Charter 
party consequences of maritime security initiatives should be considered,  <http://www.bimco.org/>, 2007. 
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 responsible for any breach or misconduct in improving or surveying the 
implementation processes according to the regulations and rules stipulated by 
international instruments and national law. Seafarers and all personnel from ports 
and related activities should be given guidance on how to use efficiently and 
effectively the related guidelines and instructions given by the authorities and 
companies on the subject.  
 
 The security of maritime cargo and, in particular, containerized maritime 
cargo, poses challenges from both the legislative and technical viewpoints. All 
parties involved should be also aware of this issue237. Close cooperation between 
shipping companies, masters and crews, police, customs, coast guards and other 
related security agencies should be encouraged to tackle this issue. The use of 
BIMCO238 documents and instructions to guide ships in cases of stowaway threats or 
drugs on board may assist the parties in dealing with these offences. ITF 
procedures239 , marine insurance companies’ rules, the reports of maritime security 
agencies and organizations, P & I Clubs’ special circulars and recommendations are 
also very helpful for providing excellent guidance to shipowners, crews and other 
involved parties. The Master’s handbook on ship’s business240 is a powerful tool to 
assist masters in dealing with hostile and unauthorized boarders, as well as drug 
abuse and trafficking, smuggling and the duty to render aid at sea241. The shipping 
                                                 
237 See UK P & I Club on crime watch, cargo claims, stowaways , charter parties claims and good practices 
< http://www.ukpandi.com/ >, (August 8, 2007).  
238 See BIMCO advices, special circulars, instructions and its anti- drug clauses, ISPS/MTSA Clauses, 
stowaway clauses and smuggling clauses (BOXTIME Charter Party) etc., < http://www.bimco.org >, 
(August2, 2007). Restricted areas are described as well as the costs suffered by industry and the urgent need 
for cooperation between shipowners and authorities to reduce delays, costs and high penalties to ease the 
shipowner’s unfair burden. Preventive measures to tackle drug issues should be implemented on board 
vessels while in port, including the monitoring of crew, vessel search procedures, the discover of drugs and 
those related to combat the stowaway threats and related precautions should be observed. 
239 See ITF policy on stowaways, as adopted by the ITF Seafarer’s Section Conference, Singapore, 8-10 
October 1997.  Clear guidance is provided on how to deal with stowaways’ issues and efforts to be made to 
disembark the stowaway in the next first port of destination, fair treatment, care and checks to be done. 
< http://www.itfglobal.org/files/seealsodocs/453/Stowaways.pdf>, (August 2, 2007). 
240See Tuuli Anna Messer, Master’s handbook on ship’s business, 3rd ed., Centreville (Maryland): Cornel 
Maritime Press, 2001 at pp.4, 10, 22,26,42,54,100 and pp.101 to 111. 
241 See the MV Clementine Maersk Case (2005). The Captain of the containership has been blamed and 
criticized in the tabloid press for bringing 27 refugees who were rescued in the Mediterranean Sea, near 
Sicily to the UK. This case highlights the conflicts and pressure faced by a master in such a situation. 
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 industry should encourage masters in using all the valuable and useful manuals or 
handbooks when confronted with such threats242.   
4.5 The Danish and Swedish experience  
 
 As mentioned by Sjöberg 243 , all governmental agencies involved in 
combating stowaways, smuggling of drugs and contraband by sea are working 
closely to tackle these issues. Their main strengths include security information; 
communication and cooperation between the different actors, such as police, customs 
and coast guards. They use an integrated network system where particular 
information and specific trends are surveyed 24hours a day, and exchanges among 
them are done regularly and assessed continuously. The findings are intelligence 
based. In Sweden, stowaway threats are presumed to be non-existent, but drug 
offences and contraband issues are high risks which are threatening many particular 
regions in that country. Transnational and organized violent crimes are major issues 
of concerns in this region; but no maritime terrorist activities have been reported in 
this part of the world. Nevertheless, the data and statistics must be interpreted 
carefully because there is a direct link between international terrorism and organized 
crime which share similar features. Cooperation between agencies is the most 
important aspect highlighted by the interlocutor. The first details of a maritime crime 
are analyzed carefully and interpreted by different agencies. Then, the final results 
are communicated, exchanged and reviewed. Training of all people involved in the 
maritime security field as well as exercises and drills are extremely important factors, 
                                                 
242 See Nautical Institute, “The Master’s role in collecting evidence”, London: The Nautical Institute, 1989. 
Also, The Shipmaster’s Security Manual, BIMCO, 1998. Preventive measures and remedies for drug 
smuggling, piracy and stowaways are provided in this manual, < http://www.bimco.org/ >, (May 8, 2007). 
243  Björn Sjöberg, Senior Intelligence Officer from the Swedish Customs and specialized in law 
enforcement was interviewed by the writer several hours. As well, port authorities and VTS managers of 
Malmö port, police and coast guards officers to share the experience and views with regard to the threats 
described in this dissertation. The main findings and exchanges dwelled on lessons learned by experience 
and the use of theoretical and operational approaches regarding possible countermeasures or solutions to be 
implemented to combat and eliminate the menace, its root causes and consequences, the vulnerability, 
concepts utilized to enforce their laws and mitigation measures in Sweden. Also, a general discussion on 
appropriate approaches to be implemented regarding the organized crime and its relation with the other 
threats was held which allowed the writer to confirm certain findings on the subject which encouraged him 
to carry out an in-depth analysis of the subject. 
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 contributing to the success of the enforcement agency.  The writer suggested 
focusing more on preventive than remedial measures. Screening was mentioned but 
not considered to be as important as information. During the discussion it was 
acknowledged that routine work could be a serious impediment to carrying out 
proper and reviewing the safety and security tasks. Finally, a regional approach and 
cooperation was considered to be encouraged to combat and eliminate the risks 
associated with such threats. Notably, the stowaways and drug related offences are 
treated by the Danish Maritime Authority under its technical regulations244 for inter 
alia, fixing the type of offences and their punishments, including fines and 
supplementary fines if necessary, and the duration of imprisonment. Some sanctions 
related to stowaways provide for a maximum term of one year, but for special cases 
2 years’ imprisonment plus supplementary fines may be imposed. Sweden imposes 
similar sanctions as Denmark with respect to these crimes or offences 245 . The 
sanctions and preventive measures are important features for such considered 
offences. Thus, the same conclusions have been found by comparing these two 
countries which share considerable similarities with respect to these threats and the 
countermeasures implemented to combat them. 
4.6 Maghreb Policies: new countermeasures and challenges 
 
 As mentioned in the previous chapters, the Mediterranean is the main 
gateway for stowaway threats as well as illegal immigrants into Europe. The 
Maghreb region is on the forefront regarding these threats. The problems associated 
with attempted stowaways, stowaways, asylum seekers, illegal immigration, 
smuggling of drugs by sea and contraband goods at Mediterranean borders are 
matters of common concern for the entire Maghreb States and the European Union. 
                                                 
244 See the Danish Maritime Authority’s Technical Regulation No.5 of 19 May 2003 fixing all modalities , 
preventive measures, treatment of the stowaway, notification procedures, sanctions, fines and imprisonment 
depending on the case from 1 year max to 2 years according to the nature and form of the offence, age of 
the stowaway etc.; 
245 See “The Swedish Club” for advice to masters and drug smuggling warnings as well as the statistics for 
claims reported and analyzed by the Club.  
<http://www.swedishclub.com/tm_loss_prevention/advice_to_masters_2005/Advice_to_masters.htm#Drug 
smuggling warning >, (August 5, 2007).  
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 The management of these threats is the responsibility of each State, but preventive 
and remedial measures are not enough to cease or stop the wave of stowaways and 
other related issues. Cooperation based on a regional approach and assisting States in 
the implementation process is vital to ensure that new standards are adopted on a 
wider scale. Policy makers should think carefully when enforcement regimes or 
amendments have to be implemented into national law.  
 
 As pointed out by Mejia and Mukherjee246, the spectrum of violent maritime 
criminal acts, illustrates increasing levels of sophistication in planning and violence 
in execution, but decreasing frequency of occurrence. However, stowaways and 
attempted stowaways, smuggling drugs or contraband goods are increasing in 
frequency of occurrence, because the sanctions are inadequate, the punishments and 
incentives are insufficient, and the unwillingness of society to pay the price related to 
these threats. Safety and security measures involve huge costs and their impacts and 
the results can be observed only in the long term. Policy makers in the Maghreb 
region should consider carefully the SUA 2005 Convention and analyze in- depth the 
pros and cons to determine whether or not to ratify it and its Protocol of 2005. 
Mukherjee has reviewed all aspects related to the SUA Convention 2005 and stated 
that the list of unlawful acts has been broadened in the 2005 Protocol, meaning that 
the scope of offences is wider than those stipulated in SUA 88. New provisions on 
boarding have been added and when clear grounds exist, and the conditions are 
fulfilled, the ship flying the flag of another State Party may be boarded by its 
forces247.  
 
 Policy makers and practitioners need to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the multi-dimensional phenomenon of illegal migration and 
stowaways in order to manage it effectively. Thus, it is important when drafting 
legislation to make the distinction between people smuggling and trafficking of 
human being. Furthermore, clear definitions should be provided and punishments 
                                                 
246 Supra, footnote 223 at p.66. The authors have done a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the SUA 
2005 Convention. 
247 Ibid. see article 3 and 8 bis of the SUA 2005 Convention. 
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 must be drafted accordingly. The half-way house doctrine is a balanced way to 
ensure a middle approach between mens rea offences and strict liability offences 
when sanctions are decided regarding the different threats, but before putting them 
into force. All interests, such as public welfare, good governance, and national goals 
etc., must be taken into account by legislators and policy makers to avoid excessive 
or diminished punishments accorded to the degree, nature and form of that offence. 
In summary, the efficient level of deterrence is important to determine the marginal 
social benefit of crime reduction. It is thus vital and valuable to appreciate and 
predict the effects of rules designed policy makers and legislators when drafting 
legislation. A criminal commits a crime if the expected benefit is greater than the 
expected punishment, hence, policy makers should be aware of the concepts of law 
and economics which should be applied when adopting legislation for dealing with 
maritime crimes. However, clear definitions on maritime crimes are needed and a net 
separation in the legislation between attempted stowaways, stowaways, asylum 
seekers, fortune seekers and refugees must be made when drafting the offences and 
related sanctions into national law according to the existing international instruments. 
The effects as well as a clear understanding of enforcement regimes and how well 
enforced the regulations are, is an important task for legislators and policy makers in 
the Maghreb region. The main objectives of law and economics248 are to profile the 
legal rules to be used to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in the system, as 
highlighted in Figure 14. It exposes the different avenues exploited by stowaways 
and the associated issues of repatriation, detention, expulsion and retention. 
Particular legal regimes which have been described in the previous chapters prevail 
concerning refugees, asylum seekers or statelessness stowaways or illegal migrants 
rescued at sea. Criminal acts or criminals and organized crime members as well as 
related matters fall under the criminal law regimes in the State where the offence has 
been committed and also depend on the existing accords between the sending and 
receiving countries. 
                                                 
248 See Paul S. Dempsey and William E. Thoms, Law and Economic Regulation in Transportation, London: 
Quorum Books, 1986, at pp.1-43.   
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Figure 14: Flow chart of transportation of stowaway or asylum seeker or refugee cases 
  and their associated issues  
 
 In most cases as described in the flow chart above, stowaways as fortune 
seekers or asylum seekers or refugees are repatriated249 to their countries of origin 
after detention on board the ship or in special designated centers for irregular 
immigrants, such as those existing in France or Spain, when the authorization of 
residency is denied. Various complex related issues need further research studies. 
 
 The following chapter will expose the reader to the major findings of the 
research carried out in connection with this dissertation, the conclusions reached and 
proposals offered as policy recommendations to legislators and policy makers as a 
final pronouncement on these sensitive subjects. 
                                                 
249 Repatriation from the late Latin “repatriatus” means to return to the country of origin. Whereas, 
detention is related to the state of being detained for trial or a period of temporary custody prior to such trial 
of the offender according to the existing national legal regime. The word “expulsion” means the act of 
forcing out someone from a State or forced return. It is important to highlight the removal measures 
occurring at the external border of a State, such as the “refoulement” of an offender from a country, because 
he does not fulfill the legal conditions for entry into that State. A clear distinction is to be made with 
“deportation”, which occurs when a report is made of an offence related to the residency status of the 
offender on the territory of a State. Expulsion for illegal residency covers numerous issues, such as illegal 
entry, refusal of renewal of a permit or visa, expulsion for reasons of public order, etc. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered.”-  
Aristotle, Greek critic, philosopher and physicist, 384 BC-322 BC 
 
 
5.1 Conclusions  
  
 This dissertation has attempted to steer the reader through the past and 
contemporary legal and policy issues relating to the transportation of stowaways, 
drugs and contraband goods by sea from the Maghreb region. It has highlighted the 
grey areas and gaps prevailing in the existing international legal regimes and national 
legislation. Great emphasis has been placed on the policy and security management 
processes. The enforcement mechanisms and the countermeasures and practices used 
by the shipping industry and stakeholders to combat and eliminate this perennial 
cancer with its malignancy and gangrening have been discussed. The research has 
revealed that the gross inadequacy of the enforcement system has detrimentally 
affected sea trade and international commerce. 
 
 The objective of this dissertation was to undertake a critical review of those 
threats and to attempt to provide answers to the burning questions of the adequacy of 
the current international regimes. The relevance of IMO guidelines and instruments 
has also been critically examined. In pursuance of this stated objective, the existing 
policies of the Maghreb States with respect to this menace and the strategies 
employed to counter the scourge have been identified and analysed. The study has 
revealed certain trends which are supported by statistical data and numerous other 
factors and conditions confirming the persistency of this menace. 
 
 Contemporary security events have in recent times culminated in the adoption 
of various legal instruments such as the ISPS Code, dealing with maritime security 
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 issues at both national and international levels, and numerous mechanisms have been 
put into place to raise security deterrence levels. Even so, this study shows that 
despite those measures the incidence of these threats have greatly increased in the 
Maghreb region. This could be attributed to the porous borders and the culture of 
“laissez faire”. Recent security incidents have illustrated the inadequacies of the 
existing legal regimes and their enforcement mechanisms. These are attributable to, 
inter alia, persistent discrepancies with respect to precise definitions, gaps and 
overlapping matters existing in various international instruments, such as the lack of 
definitions of maritime crime, terrorism and maritime terrorism at both national and 
international levels. IMO guidelines on illegal migrants rescued at sea and other 
associated issues have increased the scope of offences and have perplexed policy 
makers in their efforts to find appropriate sanctions. This lack of harmonization and 
unification of laws governing the distinction between crimes and non-mens rea 
offences in the existing penal regimes of Maghreb States, result in inadequate 
sanctions in the prosecution of the offenders, because the notion of maritime crime is 
perceived differently by those States. This also has a bearing on jurisdictional issues 
such as the enforcement regimes of coastal States regarding maritime crimes 
occurring in the contiguous zone. UNCLOS 82 considers only three maritime violent 
acts, piracy, slavery and drug offences; its scope is thus too narrow. 
  
These illegal activities are now controlled by transnational organized crime 
syndicates employing new means such as technology, and given the huge fortunes 
involved in this illegal trade, they impede the effectiveness and efficiency of 
responses from government enforcement agencies. This research work has also 
brought to light the main causes and potential consequences of stowaway threats and 
the pull and push factors. These crimes are facilitated by poor socio-economic 
conditions and unstable political and cultural situations prevailing in this region, 
inducing more candidates to this dangerous adventure. The weakest link in the 
security chain is port facilities which facilitate easy access to sensitive information 
related to ships and port facilities. 
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 The study has revealed that the most common type of stowaways is fortune 
seekers and potential refugees. As a result of stowaways on board ships, shipowners 
and ship operators face serious consequences. This multi faceted problem warrants a 
complete reassessment of maritime security risks and vulnerabilities through 
reviewing of the overall security risk management process.  Events have 
demonstrated time and again that if a maritime crime or security event occurs and is 
not managed appropriately, the causes will not be revealed and the objectives 
promulgated through IMO instruments will not be attained. This dissertation has also 
explained the usefulness of the continuum and spectrum of maritime crimes as well 
as the SecInciMap through which the associated consequences, latent and active 
conditions and deterrent factors and levels of responsibilities arising out of a security 
incident can be determined and explained. In addition, it has revealed that the 
preventive measures are the most important to be considered by policy makers to 
reduce or eliminate the risks of such occurrences, whereas remedial measures 
mitigate their effects and are the last barrier of the security system. 
  
The international legal regimes do not tackle the problem in its totality. The 
appropriate examples falling under this scope are the SUA 2005 Convention and 
related instruments where definitions and technical aspects are still controversial 
issues and barriers for their ratification. In this perspective criminalization and unfair 
treatment of seafarers in cases of maritime security incidents are issues which need 
more in-depth analysis and consideration from policy makers and legislators. It could 
be deduced that stowaway threats, contraband goods and smuggling of drugs share 
similar salient features regarding their root causes and potential consequences. Also, 
these sensitive issues which were considered by the views of various scholars, legal 
instruments and the open literature are still controversial and open to debate. As such, 
an ill-advised reader or policy maker may be easily trapped by the complexity in 
differentiation or categorization of such offences in terms of determining the most 
appropriate sanctions according to their forms, nature and scale. Consequently, this 
research has highlighted the utility of flow charts or appropriate maps which can 
guide policy makers. The use of the half way house concept to find an intermediate 
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 solution to determine sanctions is aptly illustrated. The interviews conducted in the 
course of the research brought to light the main maritime security components for 
effectively countering security threats, including the flow of sensitive security 
information, intelligence, and communication, efficient general risk management 
process, reporting culture and security awareness. 
5.2 Recommendations  
  
 As global sea trade and the world economy keep on growing by leaps and 
bounds, there will be a boost in containerization of carriage of goods by sea with 
concomitant increase in modernization of port facilities and related infrastructures in 
the Maghreb region to respond to changing demands. Container security threats, the 
phenomenon of stowaways, smuggling of drugs and contraband goods will grow in 
parallel with these developments. In addition, persistent disparities between the 
general living standards of people in the Maghreb and Africa and those in the 
developed world will be an impetus for massive illegal migration towards the 
industrialized world, creating opportunities for organized transnational crime 
syndicates or cartels to exploit the weaknesses generated by lack of enforcement 
regimes and poor decision-making at all levels. In this regard, there is an urgent need 
to decisively tackle the root causes, such as unemployment, drug culture and 
narcotics trafficking in the Maghreb and other parts of Africa, famine and ethnic 
conflicts. The deculturization of people groups, massive displacement of people, high 
costs of living and the aspirations for better life are contributing factors to all these 
threats.   
5.2.1 International legal instruments 
 
To provide the basis for them to act, there is an urgent need for Maghreb 
States to accede to and transform the provisions of SUA 2005 Convention and its 
Protocol of 2005 into their national legislation. They can then board suspicious ships 
and prosecute offenders in accordance with those legal instruments. IMO guidelines 
and recommendations on maritime security should be considered when drafting 
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 legislation and amending existing instruments. There are clear grounds for adopting 
appropriate and precise definitions of “maritime crime” and “maritime terrorism”. 
None of the international legal instruments dealing with these issues adequately 
define these concepts; consequently, this hampers decisive prosecution of such 
threats. As the scope of such offences is narrow in most of the existing instruments, 
for example, the SUA 2005 Convention, there is a need to broaden the scope because 
of the emergence of new threats not considered previously by policy makers. 
Regional agreements creating stronger legislation for prosecution of maritime crimes 
and related non-mens rea offences occurring in the contiguous zone should be 
considered. Since a security system is as strong as its weakest link, a synergistic 
approach to global security management is suggested. This calls for closer technical 
cooperation and assistance among regional States and the creation of training 
opportunities in the maritime security field at all levels. Amendments to UNCLOS 
82 provisions are suggested to broaden the scope of States’ jurisdictions over violent 
maritime acts and offences.  
 
  In addition, to effectively and efficiently combat the menace, Maghreb States 
should give effect to the provisions of the UN Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime of 2000 and its Protocols of 2000, and UN Convention against 
Corruption of 2000 and the Drug Control Treaties and related resolutions into their 
national laws. IMO could provide a maritime criminal code, based on the same 
approach as for the ISM or ISPS Codes, where all these offences are precisely and 
concisely defined and categorized, and related sanctions are prescribed. This 
possibility may encourage new proactive maritime security measures and create a 
security awareness culture among member States.  
5.2.2 Maghreb security policies 
 
 The Maghreb States should adopt new security strategies to counter this 
menace by promoting security awareness and implementing recently developed 
concepts and methods, such as the SecInciMap or MarCrimMap. Policy makers 
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 should consider reviewing all security risk management processes used for the 
implementation of the ISM and ISPS Codes. Particular emphasis should be placed on 
preventive and remedial measures to encourage prevention, deterrence and 
mitigation. Strengthened control measures and additional internal and external audits 
may diminish the risks of errors or failures. The restricted access to sensitive 
information should be reinforced by increasing controls and surveillance at all 
management levels in the organizational structure.  
5.2.3 New maritime security perspectives for the shipping industry  
 
Provisions dealing with seafarers’ rights, duties and responsibilities linked to 
maritime security issues to prevent unfair and unjustified criminalization of masters 
and crew should be enforced. The views of experts in the shipping industry, 
stakeholders and academics should be taken into account by senior management.  
The following broad outline of policy is suggested:  
• A broadened security agenda to combat these threats. 
• Negotiation of agreements to be encouraged at all levels. 
• Integration of the issue of stowaways in the national strategies of reduction of 
poverty, unemployment and other related root causes. 
• Elaboration of common and harmonized policies at all levels, national and 
regional. 
• Implementation of stowaways, drugs/narcotics, smuggling and trafficking, 
and contraband goods observatories or survey centers, and endow them with 
forecasting and alert instruments. In addition, data, statistics, trends and 
reports by security agencies or designated bodies in charge of surveys should 
be provided. 
• Institution of stronger laws and penalties to raise the risk of participating in 
contraband markets and laissez faire. 
• The expansion of auditing and verification procedures to all parties involved 
and systems to increase the risk of detection at all levels in the organizational 
system. 
 
Finally, this study highlights the need for further research work to be encouraged 
by the threatened countries themselves. Thus, accurate data, statistics and trends 
must be provided by them and reported to the designated international organizations 
to obtain, in the long term, the real impacts of such security measures and policies in 
the maritime security domain. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
 
Map of the Maghreb States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Source:  The Maghreb Review, quarterly journal on the Maghreb, <http://www.maghrebreview.com>,  
(May, 2007). 
 
 
 
* The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) includes the following countries: Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and the Western Sahara region. The Maghreb 
States are situated in the highlighted yellow areas on the map. 
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 Appendix B 
Impacts of the Phoenician trade route in the Maghreb Region 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
Zone 
Triangle  
Gibraltar –Corsica - Malta
       
     
      Source:  Map of Trade routes used by the Phoenicians – 1200BC, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 
< http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/9c/PhoenicianTrade.png >, (May 31, 2007). 
 
*  Main zones of trade routes reported for North Africa: from Carthage to Tangier 
• Zone 1 : Straight of Gibraltar & Baleares  
• Zone 2 : Sardinia & Corsica 
• Zone 3 : Sicily & Isle Lampedusa & Malta  
 
Maritime activities occurred between these different geographical localities 
involving trade, flows and displacement of population, associated with various 
tragedies. Similarly, in 2007, the same movements and trends are observed according 
to IOM250 in view of the latest reports published on the subject. 
                                                 
250 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migration Initiatives 2007, Report, (Geneva: IOM, 
January, 2007), at pp. 23-26. Recognizing that the Migration as a key global phenomenon, needing various 
approaches to tackle in depth the related issues to be addressed by policy makers in the threatened regions.  
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 Appendix C 
Statistics on Stowaways – Maghreb (IMO) 
 
 
 
 The following graphs and charts provided in the Annexes C, D and E are 
based on the data published by the Facilitation Committee of IMO and 
communicated to all member States. < www.imo.org >, (July, 2007). 
 
 The main documents used are: 
 
1. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the year 2000, 
IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.71, 7 January 2002 
 < http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D4507/71.pdf > 
 
2. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the years 2001 
and 2002, IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.77, 20 January 2003 
  < http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D6616/77.pdf > 
 
3. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the years 2002 
and 2003, IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.83, 12 July 2004 
  < http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D9676/83.pdf > 
 
4. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the years 2003 
and 2004, IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.89,  3 June 2005 
  < http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14994/89.pdf > 
 
5. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the year 2005, 
IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.95, 30 June 2006 
 < http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14847/95.pdf > 
 
6. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the year 2006, 
IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.102, 17 January 2007 
  < http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D17422/102.pdf > 
 
7. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – (January to April 2007)             
 IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.103, 24 April 2007 
 < http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18743/103.pdf > 
 
 
 
99 
 Statistics on Stowaways – Maghreb (IMO) 
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  Stowaway Statistics (IMO) - Maghreb: from 2001 to April 2007 
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  Trafficking or Transport of Migrants from the Maghreb by Sea (IMO) 
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 Statistics on Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea  
 
 
Report on "Pateras" (Small boats)- Gibraltar  Strait-Tarifa-
Almeria-Las Palmas (Spanish Government)
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     Annual Statistics: Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea from the Maghreb  
 
Source:  IMO, MSC.3/Circ.10,Add.1, Unsafe Practices associated with Trafficking or Transport of      
Migrants by Sea, (28 March 2006), at p.6 and MSC.3/Circ.12, (29 January 2007). <www.imo.org>.  
 
 
Annual Stowaway Statistics(IMO)- 
Type of ship involved:2001-April 2007
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   Annual Statistics on Stowaway incidents and type of ships involved-(Worldwide) 
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 Statistics on Stowaways and Ports of destination 
in the Maghreb region  
 
 
Annual Stowaway Statistics by Region (IMO),2001-April 2007
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  Annual Stowaway Statistics by Region (IMO) – Worldwide 
 
 
Annual Stowaway Statistics(IMO)- 
Place of Disembarkation,2001-2006
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  Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO) in the Maghreb towards Europe 
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 Appendix D 
Maghreb Stowaway Statistics  
 
 
Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO), 2001-April 2007
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  Annual Stowaway Statistics by Maghreb State, place of embarkation  
 
 
 
Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO), 2001-April 2007
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  Annual Stowaway incidents by Maghreb State, place of embarkation  
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 Appendix E 
Stowaway Statistics by ports – Maghreb Countries  
  
 
Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO),  Algeria-main ports
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  Stowaway Statistics by ports in Algeria: from 2001 to April 2007 
 
 
Annual Stowaway Statistics(IMO)- Morocco main ports, 
2001- April 2007
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  Stowaway Statistics by ports in Morocco: from 2001 to April 2007 
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 Appendix F 
Stowaways and attempted Stowaways Statistics, 
 Algeria-Year 2006 
 
Alger
70%
Oran 
12%Skikda
8%Arzew
5%
Dellys
1%
Ghazaouet
3%
Mostaganem
1%
 
       Stowaways & Attempted Stowaways by main ports-Algeria (2006) 
 
Stowaways and Attempted Stowaways Statistics -2006 (Ministry of Transport-Algeria)
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     Stowaways & Attempted Stowaways Statistics by main ports-Algeria (2006) 
 
Source: Direction de la Marine Marchande (DMM), “Annual Statistics- 2006”, Ministry of Transport   
             – Algeria, < http://www.ministere-transports.gov.dz/>, (July, 2007). 
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 Appendix G 
Stowaway Problem Areas – Africa 
Long - term: (1989-2007) 
 
 
 
Algeria 
Morocco 
 
  Map of Stowaway problem areas-2007 (Africa) 
 
Source: Robmarine Online services, <http://www.robmarine.com/indexe.html >, (July, 2007). 
 
 
Africa remains the largest source of stowaway activity and in particularly 
Morocco, followed by Algeria regarding the Maghreb region. In accordance with 
demands for stowaway related information from P&I clubs, the IMO and the ICS, the 
latest stowaway data, maps and news on the affected areas have been analyzed by 
Robmarine services.  For Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, no accurate data are 
available.  
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 Appendix H 
Maritime Crime Triangle & Cycle 
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  The Maritime Crime Triangle and Cycle using Ergonomics -Economics  
     Theories & Law  
 
 
• This triangle is based on the theory of Crime Triangle and has been 
adapted to the Maritime Crime in considering Ergonomics and Economics 
Principles & Law in case of an incident. 
 
Elements of the Crime Triangle Strategy 
Opportunity to commit the offence – The 
Victim Increase the risk of apprehensions 
Ability to commit the offence Increase the effort required to commit the offence 
Desire to commit the offence Reduce the rewards available to the offender 
 
 
Source: < http://www.police.qld.gov.au/Regional+Policing/metroNorth/robbery/triangle.htm > 
(July, 2007)  
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 Appendix I 
The Drug trade in the Maghreb region 
 
 
  The Drug trade and routes in the Maghreb Region in 2007 
 
Source:  “Reports of the National Gendarmerie in Algeria regarding the drugs trade and quantity 
 confiscated in 2006-April 2007”, published in the national newspaper Liberté, April 30, 2007, 
                      < http://www.liberte-algerie.com/ >, (June, 2007). 
 
  Map of the world use of cannabis (kif) – UNODC- World Drug report 2007 
 
Source: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2007,  
           (Vienna: UNODC, United Nations Publications),  
        < http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/world_drug_report.html >, (July, 2007). 
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 Appendix J 
Status Conventions – Maghreb States (IMO) 
 
 
X: accession;   d: denunciation  
          Status of Conventions (IMO) – Maghreb States – June 2007 
 
Source: IMO, “Status of Conventions by country”, 
 < http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D19160/status.xls >, (July 10, 2007). 
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 Appendix K 
IMO Resolutions-Maritime Security 
 
A.584 (14) Measures to prevent unlawful acts 
A.738 (18) Measures to prevent and suppress piracy/armed robbery against ships 
A.773 (18) Enhancement of Safety of Life at Sea by the Prevention and Suppression of 
  Unsafe Practices associated with alien smuggling by ships 
 
A.867 (20) Combating unsafe practices associated with the trafficking of transport of 
  migrants by sea 
 
A.871 (20) Guidelines on the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful  
  Resolution of Stowaway Cases 
 
A.872 (20) Guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of drugs, 
  psychotropic substances and precursor chemical on ships engaged in  
  international maritime traffic 
MSC/Circ.896/Rev.1 Interim measures  for combating unsafe practices associated with the 
  trafficking or transport of migrants by sea 
A. 920 (22) Review of safety measures and procedures for the treatment of persons  
  rescued at sea  
A. 922 (22) Code of practice for the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed  
  robbery against ship 
A. 923 (22) Measures to prevent the registration of phantom ships 
A. 924 (22) Review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which  
  threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships 
FAL.7 (29) Adopted on 10 January 2002.Adoption of amendments to the Convention on 
  facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965, as amended 
MSC.167 (78)   Guidelines on the treatment of persons rescued at sea 
MSC/Circ.443 Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews onboard  
  ships 
Revised MSC/Circ. 622   Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing 
  piracy and armed robbery against ships 
Revised MSC/Circ.623 Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews 
  on preventing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships 
110 
 MSC/Circ. 113 Guidance to masters, companies and duly authorized officers on the  
 requirements relating to the submission of security related information  
 prior to the entry of a ship into port 
MSC/Circ. 1131   Interim guidance on voluntary self-assessment by SOLAS Contracting  
     Governments and by port facilities  
MSC/Circ. 1132   Guidance relating to the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the 
     ISPS Code 
MSC/Circ. 1133   Reminder of the obligation to notify flag States when exercising control 
     and compliance measures 
MSC/Circ. 1067   Early implementation of measures to enhance maritime security 
MSC/Circ. 1072   Guidance on provision of ship security alert systems  
MSC/Circ. 1073   Measures to enhance maritime security- Directives for Maritime Rescue 
     Co-ordination Centres (MRCCS) on acts of violence against ships 
MSC/Circ. 1074   Measures to enhance maritime security. Interim guidelines for the  
     authorization of Recognized Security Organizations (RSO) acting on  
     behalf of the Administration and/or designated authority of a Contracting 
    Government  
MSC/Circ. 1097   Guidance relating to the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2  
     and the ISPS Code 
MSC/Circ. 1111 Guidance relating to the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the 
    ISPS Code 
MSC/Circ. 1112   Shore leave and access to ships under the ISPS Code 
MSC/Circ. 1154   Guidelines on training and certification for company security officers 
MSC/Circ. 1155   Guidance on the message priority and the testing of ship security alert  
     system 
MSC/Circ. 1156   Guidance on the access of public authorities, emergency response services 
      and pilots on board ships to which SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS  
      Code apply 
MSC/Circ. 1157   Interim scheme for the compliance of certain cargo ships with the special 
      measures to enhance maritime security  
MSC/Circ. 1188   Guidelines on training and certification for port facility security officers  
MSC/Circ. 1193   Guidance on voluntary self-assessment by Administration and for ship  
      security 
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 MSC/Circ. 1194   Effective implementation of Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code 
MSC/Circ. 1217   Interim guidance on voluntary self-assessment by companies and company 
     security officers (CSOs) for ship security 
 
 
 
UNCLOS 82 
 
 
 
 
Article 98:  Duty to render assistance 
 
 
 
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so 
without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: 
 
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; 
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of 
their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him; 
(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, 
where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of 
registry and the nearest port at which it will call. 
 
2.  Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an      
adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, 
where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with     
neighbouring States for this purpose.     
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 Appendix L 
SUA 88 Convention  
 
Article 3 
 
1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally: 
 (a)  seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of  
  intimidation; or 
 (b)  performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is  likely to 
  endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 
 (c)   destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger 
  the safe navigation of that ship; or 
 (d)  places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or  
  substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause  damage to that ship or  its  
  cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that  ship; or 
 (e)  destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously interferes 
  with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe  navigation of a  
  ship; or 
 (f)   communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe 
  navigation of a ship; or 
 (g)  injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted  
  commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a)  to (f). 
2. Any person also commits an offence if that person: 
 (a)  attempts to commit any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1; or 
 (b)  abets the commission of any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1 perpetrated by 
  any person or is otherwise an accomplice of a person who commits such an offence; 
  or 
 (c)  threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national law, aimed at 
  compelling a physical or juridical person to do or refrain from doing any act, to  
  commit any of the offences set forth, in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b), (c) and (e), 
  if that threat is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship in question. 
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 Appendix M 
The Security Incident Map (SecInciMap ) 
 
 
   SecInciMap of the Alondra Rainbow Incident  
 
Source: Max Q. Mejia Jr. and Roland Akselsson, ““AcciMapping” Maritime Security Incidents: a 
pilot study”, lecture handouts MLP 402, Maritime Law & Policy course, Malmö: WMU, 2007. 
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 Appendix N 
Risk Management Process in a Dynamic Society 
 
 
 
   Risk management in a dynamic society  
 
Source:       Jens Rasmussen and Inge Svedung, Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic Society, 
      Karlstad: Risk center, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 2000 at p.11.  
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 Appendix O 
The General Security Risk Assessment Process 
 
 
 
 
 
  The General Security Risk Assessment Process Flow Chart 
 
 
Source: Jens - Uwe Schröder, “An introduction to shipboard security assessment”, in Maximo Q. Mejia 
Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, a selection of papers and presentations from the 
Workshop-Symposium on the Practical Implementation and Critical Evaluation of the ISPS Code 11-15 
August 2003 and the International Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security 30 August to 1 
September 2004, Malmö: WMU, 2005 at p.114. 
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 Appendix P 
Maritime Crime Progression Map  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: This map was adapted from SecInciMap by Max Q. Mejia Jr., 2007, and 
from General Maritime Security Assessment Progress Flow Chart by Jens-Uwe 
Schröder, 2003 and from Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents by James 
Reason, 1997. 
 
 This map presents an overview of the roles of each component of the system 
and indicates the flow of events occurring when there is a breakdown of preventive 
measures, and that only mitigation measures could attenuate the possible effects on 
the system.  
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 Appendix Q 
Investigation of Maritime Crimes / Security Incidents 
 
4. Institutional
Management level 
3. Companies –
Ports Management
level
2.Operational level
Ships-port facilities
Work activities
1. Maritime Crime 
or Security
Incident
Incident /
Maritime crime
Operational level
Policy makers
Companies
Government
Ports 
Ships 
Port facilities
Le
gis
lat
or
s 
3
2
1
4
Management systems investigated at all management levels after 
a maritime crime / security incident occurred
© Copyright Semir Tarek Maksen, 2007
Po
lic
y 
an
al
ys
ts
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chart highlights the different levels involved in the management of 
maritime security domain and their interactions with one another. It shows a 
hierarchical structure of responsibilities which aids in the identification of areas of 
failures in the system.  
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